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ANTONIO:

The Duke cannot deny the course of law: For the commodity that strangers
have with us in Venice, if it be'denied, will much impeach the justice of his
state.
INTRODUCTION

During the past several years,.the subject of employee drug testing has generated a great deal of controversy. 2 Prior to the 1980s,
testing employees for illicit drug use was a rarity.3 Although testing
occurred in the military and in drug treatment programs, the concept of widespread employee drug testing in the 1970s would have
shocked the American public.4 The 1980s and early 1990s have
been different. 5 The Government's anti-drug campaign, heightened
public awareness of the drug problem, and the increased availability
of inexpensive urine drug testing services have caused the proliferation of drug testing in the private workplace. 6 In addition to drugs,
employers test for honesty, genetic defects, and, of concern here,
7
the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS).
The 1990s will see an America suffering from AIDS. Through
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 3, sc. 2.
2. SeeJon D. Bible, When Employers Look for Things Other Than Drugs: The Legality ofAIDS,
Genetic, Intelligence, and Honesty Testing in the Workplace, 41 LAB. LJ. 195, 195 (1990) (explaining
that controversy over employee drug testing has erupted in recent years). Controversy regarding drug testing in the workplace originates from the opposing interests of employers
and employees. Employers use testing programs to combat the business risks posed by employees under the influence of illicit substances. Employees often view the tests as a threat to
their integrity and reputation, and attack them on grounds ofprivacy and accuracy. Id.; see also
John Horgan, Your Analysis is Faulty, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 2, 1990, at 22-24 (questioning validity ofjustifications for mandatory employee drug testing given by official at National Institute
on Drug Abuse); Body Invaders, THE NATON,Jan. 8/15, 1990, at 39 (asserting that Department
of Transportation's drug testing program is "horrendous assault on personal autonomy, individual liberty and constitutional rights"); B.D. Colen, What Price Drug-Free?, HEALTH, May
1988, at 6, 10 (positing that employee drug testing is constitutionally suspect and diverts
resources from better measures of prevention); Neil Cohen,Just Say No ... To Mandatory Drug
Testing, SPORT, May 1987, at 6 (contending that mandatory testing of athletes is "unreliable
substitute" for more dependable methods of drug prevention); Nat Hentoff, Presumption of
Guilt, PROGRESSIVE, May 1986, at 24 (noting that drug testing of all Federal Government employees is "massive" invasion of workers' privacy).
3. Kevin B. Zeese, Drug Testing Here to Stay?, 12 CEO. MASON U. L. REV. 545, 545 (1990).
4. See id (contending that employer's demand for employee to provide monitored urine
sample or lose job would have been "shocking" prior to 1980s). Also, at this time, drug
testing in the military was not used for disciplinary purposes and testing in drug treatment
programs focused primarily on individuals receiving methadone maintenance. Id.
5. See id. (stating that drug testing has become American way of life).
6. Edward M. Chen et al., Common Law Privacy: A Limit on an Employer's Power To Test for
Drugs, 12 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 651, 652 (1990).
7. Bible, supra note 2, at 195.
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March 1992, 218,301 AIDS cases have been reported in the United
States, and the number is expanding so quickly that statistics at the
Centers for Disease Control are updated monthly." Indeed, AIDS
"carries the potential to be the greatest natural tragedy in human
history." 9 The World Health Organization's Global Programme on
AIDS predicts quite shockingly that by the year 2000, 6,000,000
people will have developed AIDS worldwide. 10
The American workplace, like all aspects of society, cannot escape
the impact of AIDS."I Employers feel the pressure to detect which
employees are infected because a healthy workforce is fundamental
to a profit-seeking enterprise. Healthy employees sometimes refuse
to work with those who have contracted the virus. 12 Infected employees may require leave from work to recuperate from AIDS-related health problems.' 3 Additionally, ignorant customers, fearing
contact with those who are infected, may take their business
elsewhere.14
AIDS presents such monumental societal concerns that a plethora
of lenses exist through which to view mandatory HIV testing by employers and discrimination against those who are infected. In this
Article, economics is the discipline of choice. Economics and the
law have become increasingly intertwined during the past thirty
years, the result being that economics is today applied to help ana8.

CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 1-18 (Apr. 1992).
9. WILLIAM F. MASTERS ET AL., CRISIS: HETEROSEXUAL BEHAVIOR INTHE AGE OF AIDS

11 (1988).
10. Susan Okie, Complacency Seen HurtingAIDS Fight, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1989, at A4.
The World Health Organization predicts that AIDS cases will peak in the West by the mid1990s but will continue to escalate profoundly in developing countries. Malcolm Gladwell,
AIDS Forecast Focuses on Third World, WASH. PosT, June 18, 1991, at Al.
11. See Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, AIDS in Labor Arbitration, 25 U.S.F. L. REV.
67, 67 (1990) ("Over the coming decade America will suffer greatly from the modem plague
of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome... and the American workplace will not escape its
impact."); William F. McHugh, AIDS in the Workplace: Policy, Practiceand Procedure, 18 STETSON
L. REV. 35, 64 (1988) (noting that, as AIDS epidemic grows, proportion of infected persons in
workplace will proliferate); Theresa E. Loscalzo, Note, AIDS in the Workplace: How Should Corporate America Cope?, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 527, 561 (1987) (asserting that AIDS epidemic has
placed "enormous burden" on employers because disease creates array of unanswered legal
questions relating to employment); MarkJ. Lazzo & Christopher A. McElgunn, Note, Recent
Developments: Public Health and Employment Issues Generatedby the AIDS Crisis, 25 WASHBURN L.J.
505, 525 (1986) (noting that nowhere is panic over AIDS more apparent than in workplace).
12. Bible, supra note 2, at 201 (commenting that employees often refuse to work with
others who are infected despite almost nonexistent possibility of virus being transmitted in
typical workplace of most employees).
13. Bible, supra note 2,at 201. Such absences can disrupt the workplace and escalate an
employer's costs.
14. Id. at 203 (positing that nervous customers may react adversely to an employee with
AIDS).
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lyze numerous legal questions.' 5 This Article employs economic
theory to provide a springboard from which other, more far-reach-

ing, jurisprudential topics may be considered. This predictive economic model establishes the roadmap for evaluating the possible
varied responses to the AIDS question.
This Article specifically addresses the issue of mandatory HIV
testing by employers and subsequent discrimination against those
infected with the virus. Part I outlines the pertinent medical background. Part II traces the development of AIDS-related litigation,
focusing primarily on the employment sector. Part III discusses the
pressures that compel employers to implement mandatory HIV testing. Finally, Part IV examines the issues surrounding HIV testing
through the lens of economics, applying Becker's "taste for discrimination" theory to the AIDS context. The Article concludes by ex-

ploring some far-reaching questions that implicate AIDS-related
issues.
I.

MEDICAL BACKGROUND

Before embarking on a discussion of mandatory HIV testing, a
brief medical overview of AIDS is in order. 16 AIDS is the acronym
for the terms "acquired immune deficiency syndrome." 17 Unknown
until 1980, Dr. Michael Gottlieb of UCLA discovered AIDS while
publishing a study documenting an outbreak of a rare pneumonia,
known as Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, in five homosexual men in
Los Angeles.' 8 In addition to these previously healthy homosexual
15. See infra notes 165-71 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between law
and economics).
16. Much is known about the prevalence of AIDS infection in the United States. Data is
generated from surveys and studies conducted by state and local health departments, medical
centers, the Public Health Service, and federal agencies. For a general overview of current
knowledge, see The HIV/AIDS Epidemic: The First Ten Years, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 357, 357-63 (1991) (detailing spread of AIDS in United States by factors of sex, age,
race, geography, and method of exposure).
17. The Centers for Disease Control first used the term "AIDS" in the fall of 1982. Lawrence Mass, Medical Answers About AIDS, in AIDS: THE WORKPLACE ISSUES 55, 56 (AMA Management Briefing ed., 1985).
18. See Michael S. Gottlieb et al., Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia and Mucosal Candidiasis
in Previously Healthy Homosexual Men, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1425, 1425 (1981) (illuminating
fact that studies of cellular immune function in these patients revealed potentially transmissible immune deficiency); see also Pneumocystic Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALrrY WKLY. REP. 250, 250 (1981) (concluding that data suggests possibility of cellular
immune dysfunction related to common exposure leaving individuals vulnerable to opportunistic infections); Kaposi's Sarcoma and Pneumocystis Pneumonia Among Homosexual Men-New
York City and California, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 305, 305-07 (1981) (stating
that physicians should be alert for opportunistic infections associated with immunosuppression in male homosexuals based on rising incidence of Kaposi's Sarcoma in these persons);
Henry Masur et al., An Outbreak of Community-Acquired Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia, 305
NEw ENG.J. MED. 1431, 1431 (1981) ("The occurrence of this infection among drug abusers
and homosexuals indicates that these groups may be at high risk for this infection."),
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men, later research revealed that intravenous drug abusers and recipients of contaminated blood products were also developing infections due to defective immune systems. t 9
Three years after Dr. Gottlieb published his study, research teams
in France and the United States independently identified the virus
that causes AIDS. 20 French scientists termed the virus lymphodenopathy-associated virus (LAV). 2 1 American scientists termed the
virus T-lymphotropic virus type III (HTLV-III). 2 2 Internationally,
the term that refers to the AIDS virus is human immunodeficiency
23
virus (HIV).

HIV destroys the immune system. 24 Different classes of blood
cells compose the infection-resisting force of the human body. 25
These blood cells identify foreign microorganisms, known as antigens, in the bloodstream. 26 The blood cells respond to foreign microorganisms by producing antibodies. 2 7 In turn, these antibodies
bind to the antigens to aid in their removal and destruction. 28 Thelper lymphocytes (helper T-cells), a type of white blood cell, play
an integral role in the immune system by activating the specific disease-fighting cells and producing the chemical signals to create an19. See Abe M. Macher, The Medical Background, in AIDS AND THE LAW 1, 2 (William H.L.
Dornette ed., 1987) (stating that intravenous drug users and persons receiving contaminated
blood also developed profound defects in immune systems). Cases of Epstein-Barr virusassociated-Burkitt's lymphoma, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, generalized lymphodenopathy,
and auto immune phenomena in these populations further suggest the occurrence of a common underlying immune dysfunction. Id.
20. Id at 6 (stating that during 1983 to 1984 separate research teams in France and
United States identified virus that causes AIDS).
21. See David D. Ho et al., HTLV-IIl in the Semen and Blood of a Healthy Homosexual Man, 226
Sci. 451,451 (1984) (stating that LAV, first isolated in France, appears identical to HTLV-III);
see also MIRKO D. GRMEK, HISTORY OF AIDS 66-67 (1990) (reporting that French scientists' first
isolation of LAV came from patient who did not develop AIDS until several years later).
22. See GRMEK, supra note 21, at 68 (noting that U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services announced isolation of HTLV-III by Robert Gallo and colleagues in April 1984).
23. See GRME , supra note 21, at 70 (stating that to resolve dispute between French and
American scientific teams, international commission on virological nomenclature named virus
HIV). Following isolation of LAV and HTLV-III, considerable dispute arose surrounding
whether the two viruses were really one and the same. After medical researchers established
that LAV and HTLV-III were actually the same virus, the controversy switched to the issue of
which team discovered it first. The World Health Organization recommended that the virus
be referred to as LAV/HTLV-III, whereas the U.S. Government and most English-language
scientific literature used the term HTLV-III/LAV. The international commission eventually
resolved the situation. 1d This Article will use the term HIV to refer to the virus.
24. See James D. Henry, AIDS in the Workplace, in AIDS AND THE LAw 31, 33 (William H.L.
Dornette ed., 1987) (stating that AIDS destroys body's ability to defend against infection).
Ultimately, a person infected with AIDS can be subjected to a variety of diseases that are
normally disposed of by a healthy immune system. Id
25. IA
26. l
27. IA
28. Id.
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tibodies.29 To invade the helper T-cells, HIV camouflages itself in a
substance identical to the outer coating of the helper T-cells.30 The
virus sneaks into the cell unnoticed and ultimately destroys it.31
The immune system breaks down because the signals to produce
32
antibodies cease to function.
Testing positive for HIV does not mean that a person has AIDS. 3
Rather, testing positive reveals only that the person is seropositive-meaning that the patient is infectious and able to transmit the
virus.3 4 The seropositive patient may appear totally healthy. In fact,

those who test positive for HIV often show no symptoms for many
years.3 5 Some estimate that only two to three percent of those exposed to HIV ever develop "full blown" AIDS. 3 6 AIDS-related

complex (ARC), the nonfatal condition related to AIDS but significandy less severe, occurs when a patient tests positive for AIDS and
has a specific set of clinical symptoms, such as recurrent fever, fatigue, progressive weight loss, swollen lymph glands, night sweats,
37
and diarrhea.
A.

Transmission

The threshold question of whether a significant risk of transmission of HIV exists is integral to analysis of AIDS issues. AIDS,
29. See PeterJaret, The Wars Within, 169 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 702, 708-09 (1986) (calling
helper T-cells the "commander-in-chief" of immune system). The helper T-cells identify enemy viruses and then head to the spleen and lymph nodes. Here, they stimulate B-cells that
produce the antibodies. In addition, helper T-cells activate killer T-cells that destroy cells of
the body that have been invaded by the virus. Id.
30. See Jeffrey Laurence, The Immune System in AIDS, Sci. AM. 84-90 (Dec. 1985) (stating
that protein region of cell membrane that distinguishes T-4 (helper T-cells) cells from other
lymphocytes acts as receptor for HIV virus). This region of the cell serves as the initial attachment point for the virus, which subsequently infects the lymphocyte. Id
31. See id (stating that HIV "selectively depletes" helper T-cells). The virus appears to
alter negatively the growth of helper T-ceIls while other types of T-cells multiply in relative
normalcy. Id
32. See id at 88 (noting that HIV does not need to evade detection in immune system
because virus preemptively destroys immune system before its detection).
33. See Henry, supra note 24, at 34 (asserting that it is incorrect to consider every condition related to HIV as AIDS).
34. See id at 35 (stating that current studies indicate that 80% to 95% of persons who are
HIV-seropositive do not develop AIDS within first few years of infection although they are
capable of transmitting HIV virus).
35. Bible, supra note 2, at 201; see also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, VOLUNTARY HIV COUNSELING AND TESTING: FACTS,ISSUES, AND
ANSWERS 4 (1990) [hereinafter VOLUNTARY HIV COUNSELING AND TESTING] (explaining that
HIV infection and onset of AIDS can be slowed with medical treatment). It is estimated that
one-half of all persons infected with HIV will develop an AIDS-related illness within 10 years
if they do not receive medical treatment. Id.
36. VOLUNTARY HIV COUNSELING AND TESTING, supra note 35, at 4.
37. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 11 (1986)
[hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT].
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although communicable, is not easily transmitted. 38 The disease is
transmitted only by direct injection of "bodily fluids" into the
bloodstream, which is known to occur in very limited circumstances. 39 Blood, semen, saliva, tears, breast milk, and urine are
fluids in which HIV antibodies have been detected. 40 The virus' primary means of transmission, however, is through intimate sexual
contact, intravenous drug administration, contaminated blood and
blood products, and from infected mothers to newborns.4 ' To fully
understand the transmission process, four areas merit brief discussion: (1) sexual transmission; (2) intravenous drug use; (3) saliva;
and (4) blood.
1.

Transmission during sexual contact

Although HIV is not as easily transmitted as other sexually related
diseases, sexual intercourse is a primary mode of transmitting the
AIDS virus. 4 2 Both homosexual and heterosexual partners exchange bodily fluids during sexual relations. The transfer of semen
and vaginal and cervical fluids during sexual contact can result in
43
access of the virus to blood vessels in the anus, vagina, or penis.
Even though sexual contact is a primary mode of transmission, it
does not guarantee transmission. The chances of contracting HIV
from an infected person remain slim. A study of hemophiliacs who
tested seropositive estimated that only one out of nine female sexual
partners became seropositive, and that person regularly had both
38. See Richard Green, The Transmission of AIDS, in AIDS AND THE LAw 28, 28 (Harlon L.
Dalton ed., 1987) (describing various modes of transmission of HIV and noting that AIDS
does not spread by casual contact or typical contact experienced in working environment).
39. See id, at 31 (asserting that transmission of HIV occurs almost exclusively in specific
narrow circumstances). The virus is transmitted through sexual contact and intravenous exposure to infected blood products. Ide
40. Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in
Health-CareSettings, 36 MORBIrrry & MORTALrrY WKLY. REP. Supp. No. 2S, at 3S (1987).
41. James W. Curran et al., The Epidemiology of AIDS: Current Status and Future Prospects,
229 Sci. 1352, 1355 (1985).
42. See Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus, 317 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1125, 1128 (1987) (stating that HIV is "fundamentally a sexually
transmitted virus, which is transmitted by both homosexual and heterosexual activity"); see also
Thomas A. Peterman &James W. Curran, Sexual Transmission of Human Immunodefiency Virus,
256 J.A.M.A. 2222, 2222 (1986) (asserting that acquiring infection through sexual transmission can depend on number of sexual contacts, type of body fluid to which person is exposed,
and anatomic area exposed). Hepatitis B, syphilis, and gonorrhea seem to be more easily
communicated than HIV. Id. at 2222-23.
43. Transmission through anal intercourse is, in fact, thought to be more efficient. See
James J. Goedert et al., Determinants ofRetrovirus (HTLV-III) Antibody and Immunodeficiency Conditions in HomosexualMen, 2 LANCEr 711, 715 (1984) (asserting that study suggests rectal mucosa
may be unusually vulnerable to HTLV-III lymphocytotoxic agent); Lawrence A. Kingsley et
al., Risk Factorsfor Seroconversion to Human Immunodeficiency Virus Among Male Homosexuals, 1 LANCEr 345, 347 (1987) (concluding that data clearly show that receptive anal intercourse is major mode of HIV acquisition).
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anal and vaginal intercourse with her partner.4 4 Another study
found that only ten percent of the sexual partners of seropositive
hemophiliac partners tested seropositive. 45 Sexual transmission
among heterosexuals is also a difficult task, although a male is more
likely to transmit HIV to a female partner than a female is to transmit HIV to a male partner. 46
2.

Transmission by intravenous drug use

As of 1986, intravenous (IV) drug use accounted for the transmission of twenty-five percent of AIDS cases in the United States, seventeen percent occurring where the recipient's only risk factor was
the IV drug use. 4 7 IV drug users transmit HIV when they share
drug paraphernalia, such as needles and syringes. Addicts typically
purchase the drugs, but only "rent" the needles and syringes. 4 8
49
Sharing needles symbolizes camaraderie among the drug users.
The sharing of needles provides an easy route of access for the
virus because the needle sometimes transmits blood from an in44. Mads Melbye et al., Anal IntercourseAs a Possible Factor in Heterosexual Transmission of
HTLV-1II to Spouses of Hemophiliacs, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 857, 857 (1985).
45. See HIV Infection and Pregnanciesin Sexual Partnersof HIV-Seropositive Hemophilic MenUnited States, 36 MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 593, 594 (1987) (explaining that 77 of
772 spouses or sexual partners of HIV seropositive hemophiliac patients tested seropositive
for HIV virus in medical survey).
46. See P. Volberding, AIDS-Variations on a Theme of CellularImmune Deficiency, 85 BULL.
INST. PASTEUR 87, 90 (1987) (asserting that majority of cases in United States in which one
heterosexual partner infected another involved male-to-female transmission while in Africa
female-to-male transmission of HIV has been documented at great lengths); see also Thomas
C. Quinn et al., AIDS in Africa: An Epidemiologic Paradigm,234 Sci. 955, 958 (1986) (stating that
unlike majority of North American and European AIDS patients, African AIDS victims rarely
report history of homosexual activity or intravenous drug use). Heterosexual activity, blood
transfusions, vertical transmission from mother to infant, and frequent exposure to unsterilized needles seem to account for the spread of HIV in Africa. Id. Furthermore, a study
suggests that HIV infection was associated with other sexually transmitted diseases, such as
gonorrhea, genital ulcers, and syphilis. Id These diseases, prevalent in Africa, negatively
affect genital epithelial integrity and may aid in transmission of HIV during vaginal contact.
Id. at 959.
In the United States, the incidence of female-to-male transmission is not as well known and
any conclusions are extremely controversial. See Friedland & Klein, supra note 42, at 1129-30
(noting that occurrences of female-to-male transmission have been reported infrequently in
United States whereas they are well documented in Africa). Friedland and Klein posit two
explanations for the infrequency of female-to-male transmission in the United States. First,
the disease may be simply more difficult to transfer from women to men. Id. Second, the long
incubation period for HIV ensures that many cases of AIDS that are reported today are the
result of activities that occurred years ago, when the disease was primarily transmitted between homosexual men or intravenous drug users. Id. at 1130. As more women become
infected, transmission from females to males may become more common, and thus, more
readily documented. Id.
47. Friedland & Klein, supra note 42, at 1127.
48. See Larry Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health, and Civil
Liberties, 49 OHio ST. L.J. 1017, 1022 (1989) (stating that syringes can be "rented" from
"shooting galleries" where drugs are bought and sold).
49. See id. (asserting that camaraderie is part of drug culture).
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fected person to a healthy person. 50 The first user of a new sterile
needle obviously faces no threat of contracting HIV from that needle. The user inserts the needle directly into a vein to inject the
preferred drug. When the needle is removed, it is likely to contain
traces of the user's blood. 51 If the initial user has the AIDS virus, a
subsequent user could contract HIV when inserting the used needle
52
into a vein.
3.

Transmission through saliva

The AIDS virus has been detected in saliva.5 3 Detection means
only that the antibody has been isolated, not that the fluid can transmit the virus. Most scientists believe that the risk of transmitting
AIDS through saliva is nonexistent. Four observations support this
proposition. First, HIV has been isolated in saliva only rarely and in
small amounts. 54 Second, experiments indicate that both whole saliva and saliva filtrates contain components that inactivate HIV in
vitro. 5 5 Third, there has never been a documented case where AIDS
was transmitted by saliva. 5 6 Finally, major population studies of
households, dentists, and healthcare workers in intimate contact
with infected persons evidence that viral transmission occurs in only
57
limited circumstances.
Whether HIV can be transmitted via saliva continues to be a soci50. Friedland & Klein, supra note 42, at 1128.
51. See id (stating that intravenous drug users often repeatedly inject small quantities of
drugs, thus providing ample opportunity for syringe to become contaminated with blood);
Harold M. Ginzburg, Intravenous Drug Abusers and HIV Infections: A Consequence of Their Actions,
14 LAw MED. & HEALTH CAE 268, 269 (1986) (explaining how drug users often withdraw
small amount of blood into syringe after injecting drug). This process, known as "boating,"
ensures that all of the drug is injected from the syringe. Id In the "shooting galleries," the
syringes are not sterilized. Id.
52. See Gostin, supra note 48, at 1022 (noting that while rate ofseroconversion for single
percutaneous exposure may be small, drug abusers may inject themselves thousands of times,
thus increasing risk of contracting HIV).
53. See Jerome E. Groopman et al., HTLV-Ill in Saliva of People with AIDS-Related Complex
and Healthy Homosexual Men at Risk for AIDS, 226 Sci. 447, 447 (1984) (noting that HTLV-III
was isolated in saliva of 8 of 20 individuals infected with HTLV-III); David D. Ho et al., Infrequency of Isolation of HTLV-III Virus from Saliva in AIDS, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1606, 1606
(1985) (noting that in study of 83 saliva specimens from 71 homosexual males seropositive for
HIV, only 1% tested positive for HIV).
54. See Alan R. Lifson, Do Alternate Modesfor Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Exist?, 259 J.A.M.A. 1353, 1353 (1988) (stating that laboratory data suggests that HIV is recoverable much less frequently from saliva than from blood).
55. See Patricia N. Fultz, Components of Saliva Inactive Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 2 LANcer 1215, 1215 (1986) (concluding that study indicates whole saliva and saliva filtrates can
inhibit HIV).
56. See Friedland & Klein, supra note 42, at 1132-33 (contending that preliminary studies
of persons at increased risk for HIV infection by another's saliva, such as dentists, have revealed no evidence of transmission); Lifson, supra note 54, at 1353-54 (noting that no cases of
transmission through kissing or biting have been conclusively determined).
57. See Friedland & Klein, supra note 42, at 1131-33 (stating that study of 101 household
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etal concern. Health care specialists have conducted a great deal of
research on the issue. One report, for example, documented an
adult HIV-infected patient who bit thirty health care workers without transmitting the virus. 58 Other studies have examined households that lodged an HIV-infected person. 59 Members of the
households shared common items such as eating utensils, plates,
drinking glasses, and toothbrushes. Healthy household members
also helped the infected member with eating and bathing, and even
kissed the infected member on the cheek and lips. 60 Not one member of these households who did not previously have any additional
exposure through a blood transfusion, sexual relations, or perinatal
61
transmission, contracted the AIDS virus.
Health workers who care for HIV-infected patients have also been
the subject of studies. 62 These workers are potentially exposed to
contacts of 39 AIDS patients indicates that "household contacts who are not sexual partners
of, or born to patients with AIDS are at minimal or no risk of infection with HTLV-III/LAV").
Although incidents of transmission of the virus in the health care context are rare, significant controversy erupted recently regarding a Florida dentist who allegedly transmitted HIV
to five of his patients. See Update: Transmissionof HIV Infection DuringInvasive DentalProcedureFlorida, 40 MORBIrry & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 377, 380 (1991) (reporting that evidence
"strongly suggests" that dentist suffering from AIDS transmitted HIV to five patients). The
infected dentist performed invasive dental procedures on all five of the patients after being
diagnosed with AIDS. Id. The United States Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), unable to determine the exact method of HIV transmission to the patients, reported
that "variations in procedures performed and techniques used by the health care worker, infection-control precautions employed, and the tier of the infecting agent . . ." may have
played a role in the transmission. Id. HHS further stated that this is the only known case with
strong evidence suggesting a transmission of the virus by a health care worker during an
invasive procedure. Id, It is probable that the HIV transmission in these cases was not
through saliva, but through dental instruments or equipment previously contaminated by the
blood of the dentist or another patient. Id.
58. Friedland & Klein, supra note 42, at 1132 (citing C. Tsoukas et al., Risk of Transmission
of HTLV-III/L4YVfrom Human Bites, presented at the Second International Conference on
AIDS, Paris, June 23-25, 1986).
59. See Gerald H. Friedland et al., Lack of Transmission of HTLV-IIl/LAV Infection to Household Contacts of Patients with AIDS or AIDS-Related Complex with Oral Candidiasis, 314 NEw EN. J.
MED. 344, 344 (1986) (stating that study of 101 household contacts of 39 AIDS patients indicates that "household contacts who are not sexual partners of, or born to, HIV infected patients are at minimal or no risk of infection with HIV");Janine M.Jason et al., HTLV-III/LAV
Antibody and Immune Status of Household Contacts and Sexual Partnersof Personswith Hemophilia, 255
J.A.M.A. 212, 212, 215 (1986) (finding low rate of HTLV-III/LAV seroprevalence in study of
household contacts of 34 positive hemophiliacs and 9 HIV-negative ones); Dale N. Lawrence
et al., HTLV-III/LAV Antibody Status of Spouses and Household Contacts Assisting in Home Infusion of
Hemophilia Patients, 66 BLOOD 703, 703 (1985) (concluding that likelihood of transmission of
HTLV-III/LAV from infected hemophiliacs to persons providing care for them is extremely
low based on study of 28 households containing hemophiliacs who are HTLV-III/LAV antibody positive).
60. Friedland, supra note 59, at 346.
61. See Friedland, supra note 59, at 344 (stating that only 1 of 101 household contacts had
evidence of infection; that person, a child, likely acquired HIV during childbirth);Jason, supra
note 59, at 212 (reporting that only 2 of 88 contacts tested HIV-positive, both of whom were
sexual partners of infected persons); Lawrence, supra note 59, at 704 (noting that none of 42
nonhemophilic household members tested positive at conclusion of study).
62. See David K. Henderson et al., Risk of Nosocomial Infection with Human T-Cell Lympho-
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the HIV virus by way of parenteral, mucous membrane, or open
wound exposures to blood or other bodily fluid; 63 contact with
blood or saliva during mouth-to-mouth cardiopulmonary resuscitation;64 and performance of invasive procedures with direct exposure
to saliva. 65 None of the studies documented a single case of HIV
transmission from saliva.6 6 Interestingly, nearly all the cases in
which health care workers contracted HIV resulted from accidental
needlestick injuries or mucous membrane exposure to large
amounts of blood. 67 Indeed the evidence indicates that neither sa68
liva nor casual contact can transmit AIDS.
tropic Virus Tpe IlI/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus in a Large Cohort of Intensively Exposed Health
Care Workers, 104 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 644, 644 (1986) (stating that study of 531 health care
workers provides strong evidence that risk of nosocomial transmission of HIV is extremely
low); Eugene McCray, Occupational Risk of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Among Health
Care Workers, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1127, 1128 (1986) (stating that results of health care
worker study indicate risk of occupational transmission of HTLV-III/LAV is low); Martin S.
Hirsch et al., Risk of NosocomialInfection with Human T-Cell Lymphotropic Virus III (HTLV-Ill), 312
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1, 1 (1985) (asserting that where proper procedures are used, risk of
nosocomial transmission is low); Stanley W. Weiss et al., HTLV-Ill Infection Among Health Care
Workers: Association with Needle-Stick Injuries, 254 J.A.M.A. 2089, 2089 (1985) (contending that
study of 361 health care workers and clinical laboratory personnel indicates risk of
nosocomial HTLV-III transmission appears to be low and related to percutaneous exposure).
63. See McCray, supra note 62, at 1128 (stating that study only focused on health care
workers potentially exposed to HIV-infected bodily fluids by needlestick, cuts from sharp objects, contamination of open wounds, or contamination of mucous membrane).
64. Susan M. Saviteer et al., HTLV-Ill Exposure During Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 313
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1606, 1606-07 (1985) (recommending that disposable ventilating bag and
oral airway be kept at bedside of AIDS-infected patients in event that cardiopulmonary arrest
occurs and mouth-to-mouth resuscitation is required).
65. See Friedland & Klein, supra note 42, at 1132-33 (noting that dentists are theoretically
at increased risk because they perform invasive procedures that expose them to saliva).
66. See Henderson, supra note 62, at 644 (finding that none of 150 health care workers
who reported percutaneous or mucous membrane exposure to contaminated blood or bodily
fluids demonstrated serologic evidence of HTLV-III/LAV in follow-up tests 6 to 46 months
after exposure); Hirsch, supra note 62, at 1 (reporting that none of 85 health care workers who
experienced accidental nosocomial exposure to contaminated specimens tested positive for
HIV); McCray, supra note 62, at 1228 (stating that only 2 of 451 workers tested for HTLV-III
antibody were seropositive). Both of these latter employees experienced parenteral exposure
to contaminated blood, and one may have acquired the virus through heterosexual activity.
Id.; see also Weiss, supra note 62, at 2089 (noting that only three health care workers in study
with no recognized AIDS risk factors tested seropositive). One of these three suffered puncture wounds from an infected needle. Id Heterosexual sexual activity could not be ruled out
as a cause of transmission in the other two cases. Id.
67. See James R. Allen, Health Care Workers and the Risk of HIV Transmission, 18 HASTINGS
CEN. REP. 2, 2-4 (Apr./May 1988) (asserting that studies show risk of transmission to health
care workers to be extremely low even after accidental exposure to potentially infectious
blood).
68. The Surgeon General's Report on AIDS is conclusive on this point:
There is no known risk of non-sexual infection in most of the situations we encounter
in our daily lives. We know that family members living with individuals who have the
AIDS virus do not become infected except through sexual contact. There is no evidence of transmission (spread) of AIDS virus by everyday contact even though these
family members shared food, towels, cups, razors, even toothbrushes, and kissed
each other.
SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 37, at 13.
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Testing for HIV

No test exists to detect the AIDS virus in the body. 69 Instead,
tests detect HI-V by recognizing antibodies to the AIDS virus. 70 Physicians and health care workers primarily use two tests. The United
States Food and Drug Administration first approved and licensed a
test for detecting HIV exposure in 1985. 7 1 The test is referred to
simply as "ELISA"-the acronym for enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay.7 2 ELISA, a highly sensitive and relatively inexpensive test, detects antibodies that white blood cells create in response
to invasion by the virus. 7 3 ELISA produces results within a few
hours.7 4
The second test used to detect HIV antibodies is the Western Blot
(WB). 75 An individual is considered to be seropositive for HIV only
after the enzyme immunoassay is repeatedly reactive and a confirmatory test, such as the WB, is performed. 76 If the first ELISA test
produces a positive result, a repeat ELISA test is suggested. 7 7 If the
second ELISA test also produces a positive result, a more sophisticated confirmatory test becomes necessary. 78 The WB is most often
used to confirm repetitive positive results. Like the ELISA test, the
WB test detects the presence of antibodies, not the AIDS virus
79
itself.
Neither the ELISA nor the WB produces entirely accurate results.
69. Henry, supra note 24, at 34-35.
70. Id.
71. See GRMEK, supra note 21, at 85 (stating that by summer of 1985, test developed by
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) became routine diagnostic procedure for AIDS).
72. Id. at 84.
73. Bible, supra note 2, at 202. After a blood sample is taken from the test subject, it is
mixed with a deactivated virus, and antibodies are added to the test to produce binding reactions that can be measured by a light meter. Id.
74. Id.
75. See GRMEK, supra note 21, at 69 (noting that advent of Western Blot technique greatly
improved sensitivity of HIV tests).
76. See Update: Serologic TestingforAntibody to Human Immunodeficiency Vints, 36 MORBID1TY
& MoRTALrrY Wx.y. REP. 833, 833 (1988) (stating that Public Health Service emphasizes that
person should be considered to have serologic evidence of infection only after repeated reactivity to screening tests and validation of those results by another type of test). According to
the Public Health Service, the medical and social significance of being diagnosed as HIV positive demands that the test results be both accurate and accurately interpreted. Id.
77. See Bible, supra note 2, at 202 (commenting that standard protocol is to administer
second ELISA test if first one is positive).
78. Id.
79. Id. (noting that WB test is generally not used as initial screening test because it is
more expensive and harder to administer than.ELISA). The FDA recently approved a third
diagnostic test for AIDS. See ChristopherJ. Chipello, FDA Approves Five-Minute AIDS-Test Developed by CambridgeBioScience, WALL ST.J., Dec. 14, 1988, at B5 (explaining that test requires
only one drop of blood from finger and rules out negative subjects in only five minutes without use of laboratory instruments). The new test is not widely used. At the time of its initial
marketing, the new test was priced around $10 as compared to $1 to $3 for an ELISA test.
Clinical trials of the new test on over 7000 specimens resulted in 0.47o false positives and
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The ELISA often yields false positive results, meaning that test resuits indicate that patients have HIV when, in fact, they do not.80 By
comparison, the Western Blot generates a high rate of false negative
results, meaning that test results indicate that patients are free from
HIV when, in fact, they are not. 8 ' More accurate results occur only
when the two tests are used in conjunction. Health and Human
Services estimates that ninety-nine percent accuracy can be expected when repeatedly reactive ELISAs are confirmed by a Western Blot.8 2
II.

OVERVIEW OF

AIDS LAw

Predicting the road down which AIDS law will travel requires an
understanding of its recent historical development. Those practitioners who first litigated AIDS-related issues framed legal questions concerning AIDS and employment in terms that thrust the
issues within the scope of then-existing civil rights laws prohibiting
employment discrimination.8 3 Historically, an employer retained
the right to discharge a worker for any reason, valid or not.8 4 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Act),85 which plays an integral
part in AIDS-related litigation, prohibits government agencies and
contractors from discriminating against "individuals with handicaps." '8 6 It was not until October 7, 1988 that the Department of
0.4%o false negatives. FDA officials stressed that any positive reactions obtained from this test
must be confirmed by another test. Id
80. See Bible, supra note 2, at 202 (stating that false positives yielded by ELISA makes "its
exclusive use as a job screening device risky").
81. Id It should be noted that a small chance exists that a person who tests negative may
still be infected with HIV. See GRMEK, supra note 21, at 86 (asserting that latency of seroconversion can deceive test). The body does not immediately develop HIV antibodies after infection. Seroconversion does not occur until weeks or months after infection. Accordingly, if
someone engages in high risk behavior during the six months before the test, the person may
be infected, but test negative. The body just has not yet produced antibodies. Id
82. Centers for Disease Control, Recommendation for Prevention of HIV Transmission in
Health-CareSettings, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALTY WKLY. REP. 1S-14S, Table 2 (1987).

83. See Arthur S. Leonard, AIDS, Employment and Unemployment, 49 OHIo ST. LJ. 929, 93132 (1989) (discussing whether AIDS could be conceptualized as "handicapping condition" so
as to bring it within scope of laws prohibiting employment discrimination against "otherwise
qualified handicapped individuals").
84. See Arthur S. Leonard, AIDS in the Workplace, in AIDS AND THE LAw: A GUIDE FOR THE
PUBLIC 109 (Harlon L. Dalton & Scott Burris eds., 1987) (reciting "employment at will" rule
whereby employers traditionally had complete discretion concerning employment decisions).
85. The Rehabilitation Act, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
86. d 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) states:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States, as defined in
section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any
program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service. The head of each such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the amendments to this section made by the Rehabilitation,
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Justice defined "individuals with handicaps" to include persons with
AIDS, or ARC, or who test seropositive.8 7 The Department ofJustice had earlier released a memorandum concluding that section 504
prohibited covered employers from discriminating on the basis of
the disabling effects of AIDS, but that the statute did not prevent
employers from taking measures to prevent the spread of the
88
disease.
A.

The Early Cases

The case that laid the foundation for AIDS jurisprudence did not
concern HIV. In 1979, prior to the proliferation of the AIDS epidemic, the Second Circuit decided New York State Association for Retarded Children v. Carey.8 9 The court addressed the issue of whether
mentally impaired school children who were infected by hepatitis B
virus (HBV) should be segregated from noninfected, mentally impaired students. 90 Concerned with whether HBV infection posed a
significant risk of infection to other students in the program, the
court noted that the New York City Board of Education was "unable
to demonstrate that the health hazard posed by the hepatitis B carrier children was anything more than a remote possibility." 9 1 The
Second Circuit reasoned that no one had ever shown that
nonparenteral routes such as saliva could transmit the HBV infection. 92 Even if such evidence existed, there was no proof that classroom activities "posed any significant risk that the disease would be
Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978. Copies of any
proposed regulation shall be submitted to appropriate authorizing committees of the
Congress, and such regulation may take effect no earlier than the thirtieth day after
the date on which such regulation is so submitted to such committees.
87. Justice Department Memorandum on Application of RehabilitationAct's Section 504 to HIVInfected Persons, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 195, at D-5 (Oct. 7, 1988) (stating Department of
Justice conclusion that section 504 applies to all HIV-infected individuals, symptomatic and
asymptomatic alike, whether in employment or nonemployment contexts). The Department
ofJustice's rationale for its conclusion was that persons who suffer from AIDS, ARC, or who
test seropositive are all infected with HIV, which affects the lymphatic system. Id. Section 504
defines "individual with handicaps" to include those who suffer from "physical impairments."
In turn, section 504 defines "physical impairment" to include impairment of the lymphatic
system. Id.
88.

Memo from Assistant Attorney General Cooper on Application of Section 504 of Rehabilitation

Act to Persons with AIDS, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 122, at D-16 (June 25, 1986) [hereinafter
Memo from Assistant Attorney General Cooper] (reporting that Section 504 does not address issue

of communicability and Congress' silence on subject supports Department of'Justice's conclusion that control of communicability of HIV be relegated to state and local authorities).
89. 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979).
90. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 612 F.2d 6,14, 646 (2d
Cir. 1979).
91. Id at 650.
92. Id.
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transmitted." 93 Although the Board of Education was aware that
Department of Health investigations "observed drooling, kissing,
and mouthing of mutually used equipment," the Board never
presented this evidence to the court.9 4 In fact, the court noted that
several educators who had inspected classrooms did not find evidence of unhygienic conditions in any of the classrooms. 95
The court found that the health hazard posed by the hepatitis B
carrier children was remote. 9 6 Consequently, the court concluded
that the New York City Board of Education's plan to exclude certain
mentally retarded children from regular school classes because they
were carriers of serum hepatitis violated section 504 of the Rehabili97
tation Act.
Although the court in Carey contemplated issues concerning the
hepatitis B virus, the case nonetheless set the stage for District 27
Community School Board v. Board of Education.98 In this case, parents of
healthy students demanded that school children with AIDS be excluded from attending the same school as healthy children. 99 The
court relied on Carey in determining that "handicapped individual"
included all HIV-infected persons, irrespective of whether they had
developed symptoms of ARC or AIDS.10 0 The court concluded that
the exclusion of school children with AIDS violated section 504 of
the Act.' 0 1
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. lId
96. Id97. Id. at 651.
98. 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986). The case, with facts similar to Carey, was the
earliest reported opinion to apply the Rehabilitation Act to AIDS.
99. District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 328 (Sup. Ct.
1986).
100. Id. at 336 (stating that "handicapped individual" includes not only those persons
having physical or mental impairment, "which substantially limits one or more of such persons major life activities," but also those persons regardedas having such physical or mental
impairments). Because students with AIDS are automatically excluded from school, the court
reasoned that they are "treated" as having an impairment within the meaning of section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. Id
101. Id. at 335. The court noted further that HBV was "far more contagious" than HIV.
Id. at 337. Even as early as District 27 Community School Board, a 1986 decision, the judiciary
seemed to have a competent grasp on the modes of transmission of HIV as evidenced by
statements such as the following:
The near unanimity of opinion that biting is an unlikely route of [HIV] transmission in the classroom setting is premised upon the epidemiologic data indicating no
evidence that saliva has ever been a means of transmission, even among household
members exposed to the saliva of infected persons; the "extremely low" concentration of the virus in saliva as suggested by the infrequency in culturing the virus from
the saliva of persons with AIDS; the minimal capacity of younger children to penetrate the skin to the point where enough virus particles could enter the system of the
bitten child; and the relative ease in destroying the virus through the same precau-
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The Employment Sphere

Much of the statutory and judicial response to the AIDS epidemic
has developed in the context of the workplace. Litigation often involves situations where an employer discriminates against an employee who has AIDS, ARC, or is seropositive. School Board v.
Arline 10 2 is a leading case in the employment sphere. Although not
dealing directly with HIV, courts regularly cite Arline as precedent in
cases concerning AIDS-related employment issues because it holds
that persons with contagious diseases fall within section 504.103
Gene Arline taught elementary school for thirteen years, beginning in 1966.104 In 1979, the Nassau County School Board discharged her after she suffered a third relapse of tuberculosis within
two years. The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice
Brennan, framed the issue as "whether a person afflicted with tuberculosis, a contagious disease, may be considered a 'handicapped individual' within the meaning of [section] 504 of the Act, and, if so,
whether such an individual is 'otherwise qualified' to teach elemen-

tary school." 1 05 Shortly after the Court granted certiorari, the Department of Justice issued its memorandum asserting that
discrimination by an employer against persons infected with HIV or
suffering from ARC or AIDS would not be unlawful if prompted by
fears of contagion, even if such fears were unreasonable.1 06 The
United States attempted to adopt this argument and apply it to tudons as are taken in the management of any human bite, namely, careful washing of
the wound with soap and water followed by alcohol....
It is undisputed that the mere presence of [HIV] in blood does not mean that it can
be easily transmitted by external blood-to-skin contact. Most of the physicians' testimony was addressed to the subject of the so-called "theoretical risk" of transmitting
AIDS through exposure of open skin lesions or mucous membranes to blood of an
infected child during a fight, as a result of a nosebleed, or even from the childhood
practice of becoming "blood brothers/sisters." . . . Several doctors dismissed the
risk of transmission posed by a mixing of blood as... "generally improbable;" "wild
speculation;" "extremely, highly improbable;" and "practically non-existent."
Id. at 331-32.
102. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
103. See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1522 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding in civil
rights action by HIV-positive inmates that policies and procedures of Alabama Department of
Corrections, which disclosed inmates' HIV status, did not violate any constitutionally protected privacy rights); Doe v. Attorney Gen., 941 F.2d 780, 797 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that
physician with AIDS had right of action under Rehabilitation Act against FBI for refusal to
send agents and applicants to physician pursuant to procurement contract); Severino v. North
Myers Fire Control Dist., 935 F.2d 1179, 1182 n.4 (1Ith Cir. 1991) (holding that firefighter
was not discriminated against through discharge because of refusal to perform light duty assignments following his voluntary resignation after contracting AIDS); Glanz v. Vernick, 756
F. Supp. 632, 638 (D. Mass. 1991) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment in
action brought by HIV-positive patient against physician and clinic for refusal to perform
elective ear surgery).
104. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 276 (1987).
105. Id. at 275.
106. See Memofrom Assistant Attorney GeneralCooper, supra note 88, at D- 11 (discussing irrele-
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berculosis.t 0 7 Justice Brennan, however, rejected this argument and
the Court ultimately held that a person suffering from tuberculosis
can be a handicapped person within the meaning of section 504.108
The Court remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether plaintiff was "otherwise qualified" for her position. In answering this question, the Court instructed the district court to give
appropriate weight to the legitimate concern of "avoiding exposing
others to significant health and safety risks."109
Arline led the way for future courts to apply section 504 in situations in which employees with AIDS were victims of discrimination.
The Ninth Circuit, in Chalk v. United States District Court, 0 held that
protection under section 504 does not require as a prerequisite absolute certainty that HIV transmission could not occur from schoolroom or workplace contact."' In Chalk, the local Board of
Education denied reinstatement to a high school special education
teacher diagnosed with AIDS, even though his physician certified his
1 2
ability to return to work. "
More recently, in Leckelt v. Board of Commissioners," 3 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Rehabilitation Act did not protect Leckelt, a
licensed practical nurse who was discharged after he refused to submit to an HIV test. 1 4 A physician at the hospital employing Leckelt
informed the hospital's infection control committee that she knew of
an employee who was the associate of a current AIDS patient at the
hospital, namely Leckelt. 115 While working as a nurse, Leckelt administered oral and intravenous medication, changed dressings,
performed catherizations, administered enemas, and started IV
vancy of reasonableness analysis of employment decisions based on characteristics beyond
scope of section 504).
107. Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 n.7. Justice Brennan attempted to distinguish the tuberculosis
situation from the AIDS situation. He commented that, unlike AIDS, where a carrier of the
disease may not suffer any symptoms or physical impairments, tuberculosis gives "rise both to
a physical impairment and to contagiousness." Id. (emphasis in original). He explained:
This case does not present, and we therefore do not reach, the questions whether a
carrier of a contagious disease such as AIDS could be considered to have a physical
impairment or whether such a person could be considered, solely on the basis of
contagiousness, a handicapped person as defined by the Act.
Id
108. Id at 289.
109. Id at 286.
110. 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
111. Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1988).
112. Id. at 703-04. The teacher, Vincent Chalk, sought a preliminary and permanent injunction barring the Orange County Department of Education from excluding him from classroom duties. Id. at 703. Finding that Chalk had a strong probability of success on the merits
and that there was a possibility of irreparable injury, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower
court's denial of the motion. Id. at 710.
113. 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990).
114. Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 909 F.2d 820, 833 (5th Cir. 1990).
115. Id. at 822.
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tubes. 116 Leckelt wore rubber gloves when performing a catheterization or changing a dressing, but unless he had a cut, abrasion, or

open wound on his hands, he only used a hand wash when starting
an IV or giving an injection. 1 7 The court concluded that section
504 was inapplicable because the hospital discharged Leckelt for violating infection control policies on reporting infectious or commu-

nicable diseases, and not because he was an AIDS carrier.I"
A final example of the Arline decision's influence on the application of section 504 in the context of HIV is Cain v. Hyatt." 9 In Cain,
a district court held that section 504 protected an employee who was
discharged because of testing positive for HIV.120 In this case, Hyatt Legal Services, an establishment that provides legal services for a
fee, discharged a regional partner after he was hospitalized for
pneumonia and subsequently diagnosed with AIDS. 12 1 In finding
that the partner was entitled to punitive damages, the court concluded that AIDS is a handicap that was not shown to be job
22
related.'
C. Mandatory HIV Testing
Courts have issued few published opinions that consider
mandatory HIV-infection testing for employment purposes. Only
one case has reached the federal appellate level. In that case, Glover
v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation,'23 employees of a
health services agency challenged the validity of a Nebraska administrative agency's personnel policy requiring HIV and hepatitis B
testing.' 24 Eastern Nebraska Human Services Agency (ENHSA) is a
state agency that provides care for mentally retarded persons in Nebraska.12 5 In 1987, ENHSA adopted Chronic Infectious Disease
116. Id at 821.
117. Id. At trial, a patient under Leckelt's care testified that Leckelt removed bandages
from the patient's incision, manipulated her wound, and reinserted a needle intravenously.
Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1383 (E.D. La. 1989), aff'd, 909 F.2d 820
(5th Cir. 1990). At no time did he wear gloves, even though he had a cut on his finger that
was covered with a blood-soaked adhesive bandage and a paper towel. Id. Because the pa-

tient was under the effect of various medications when she made these observations, the district court found "the full extent of [the patient's] testimony to be unlikely." Id. Nonetheless,
the court also found that Leckelt "did not utilize barrier precautions (gloves) during his care
of [the patient's] intravenous line and surgical wound." Id.
118. Leckelt, 909 F.2d at 825-26.
119. 734 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
120. Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 686-87 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
121. Id at 672-76.
122. See id at 678-82 (describing consideration of AIDS under Pennsylvania Human Relations Act).
123. 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989).
124. Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation, 867 F.2d 461, 462
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932 (1989).
125.

Id.
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Policy No. 8.85, which required certain employees to submit to HIV
and hepatitis B testing. 126 ENHSA was concerned that the mentally
retarded patients who engaged in violent or aggressive behavior, including biting and scratching, risked contracting either AIDS or
hepatitis B from an infected employee.1 2 7 Consequently, ENHSA
instituted the policy in "the pursuit of a safe work environment for
all employees and a safe training and living environment for all developmentally disabled persons receiving services from the

[a]gency."' 28
Interestingly, neither the district court nor the appellate court discussed section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The courts instead analyzed the issues as if they involved drug testing, deciding the
controversy by a balancing of Fourth Amendment rights. After establishing that mandatory blood testing constitutes a search and
seizure, the Eighth Circuit noted that the "search's reasonableness
is measured by 'balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion

on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.' "129 At trial the parties presented extensive evidence,
including the medical characteristics of the AIDS virus.' 30 The evidence established that the risk of transmission of AIDS from an employee to a patient was negligible.' 3 ' Both the district court and the
32
Eighth Circuit seriously considered the severe nature of AIDS.'

As a constitutional matter, however, ENHSA's articulated interest in
requiring testing failed to justify requiring employees to submit to
33
testing as a requisite of continued employment.'
Local 1812, American Federation of Government Employees v. United
States Department of State' 3 4 also addresses mandatory testing for
126. Id at 462.
127. Id at 463.
128. Id at 462.
129. Glover, 867 F.2d at 463 (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987)).
130. Glover, 686 F. Supp. at 245.
131. Clover, 867 F.2d at 464; Glover, 686 F. Supp. at 249. In fact, the district court found
the chance that a patient would contract HIV from an infected employee is "minuscule, trivial,
extremely low, extraordinarily low, theoretical, and approaches zero." Id at 251.
132. See Glover, 867 F.2d at 464 (acknowledging severe nature of diseases that state agency
sought to address, yet finding that procedures are unwarranted due to minimal risks of contagion in workplace); Glover, 686 F. Supp. at 249 (noting that while there is presently no cure for
AIDS, there is almost nonexistent chance of infection of health care workers through exposure at work).
133. Glover, 867 F.2d at 464. In reaching its conclusion, the Eighth Circuit seemed concerned with how future courts would interpret the decision. The Eighth Circuit explicitly
stated that it did not intend to create a "broad-based rule with regard to testing public employees for any infectious disease, including AIDS and hepatitis B." Id. Rather, the Eighth
Circuit merely held that ENHSA's policy was properly enjoined "as an unreasonable search
and seizure under the fourth amendment." Id
134. 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987).
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HIV. In Local 1812, the Department of State required Foreign Service candidates, prior to appointment, and current employees to
submit to a comprehensive medical examination "to determine the
presence of any physical, neurological, or mental condition of such a
nature as to make it unlikely that they would be able to function on a
worldwide basis."1' 3 5 The examination involved a number of blood
tests to detect a variety of diseases, including hepatitis, syphilis,
sickle-cell anemia, and various forms of cancer.' 36 In November
1986, the Department of State expanded its fitness program to include mandatory testing for HIV. :3 7
Integral to the court's analysis was the notion that the testing program targeted fitness for duty in a specialized government agency,
rather than stopping the spread of HIV.' 3 8 According to the Department of State, HIV-infected persons were impaired and medically unfit for worldwide service because they might be put at posts
where medical care was inadequate to handle HIV-related sicknesses.' 3 9 These employees could be exposed to health and sanitary conditions that are particularly hazardous to carriers of HIV.140
The testing involved nothing more than an additional examination
of a blood sample already required of an employee or candidate
under established procedures. The court, relying on the Fourth
Amendment and section 504, concluded that testing for HIV was
"rational and closely related to fitness for duty.1 14 1
III.

WHY WOULD AN EMPLOYER TEST?

Having outlined the medical background of AIDS and having
traced the development of the law of AIDS testing, the Article now
135. Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F.
Supp. 50, 51 (D.D.C. 1987) (citing 22 C.F.R. § 1l.l(e)(2) (1986)).
136. Id at 52.
137. Id
138. Id. at 53.
139. Id. at 52. The court appeared to be persuaded by the Department of State's argument that physicians at many foreign posts are less familiar with HIV-related diseases than
those in the United States. Id. at 53 & n.3. The court reasoned that even asymptomatic HIVinfected persons derive benefit from regular medical monitoring of their condition. Id. at 53.
The court looked to the legislative history of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 to corroborate
this argument. Id at 53 & n.4. According to the House report, endemic to the 46 "hardship
posts" in Africa are
[h]igh heat and humidity, a hostile natural environment, unsanitary conditions, tropical diseases such as malaria, hepatitis, cholera, and meningitis ....
Inadequate hospitals, a shortage of doctors or nurses, and few flights in and out of the capital city,
which are necessary in cases of emergency, combine to present considerable health
hazards to individuals serving at these posts.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 992, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 7 (1980)).
140. Id at 53.
141. Id The court further noted that the Department of State conducted the tests in a
reasonable manner that protected privacy. Id
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addresses the question, "Why would an employer choose to institute a mandatory HIV test?" Employers justifiably have many reasons for screening applicants and current employees as a condition
of extending an offer of employment or for continued employment.
Businesses bear the costs of hiring and training workers. An em-

ployer seeks to recruit quality employees, regardless of the position.
Ideally, an employer would hire only faithful, stable, trustworthy,
credible, dependable, reputable, and reliable persons. This may be
a difficult task because an applicant's credentials do not always paint
a clear or accurate picture of an employee. The conscientious employer needs to look beyond the four corners of a resume. Limited
job markets and intense competition force some workers to embellish their qualifications. Extensive investigation into the background of every individual who applies for a position is an

expensive task.' 42 Intelligence and psychological testing, honesty
testing via polygraphs, genetic screening, drug testing, and HIV
testing are all methods that help the inquisitive employer probe into

43
the psyche of the worker at reasonable costs.'
The concept of employment screening is not new. Aptitude and
psychological testing began in the 1940s when large industrial com-

panies preparing for war needed an efficient way to determine which
applicants were best suited for certain tasks.1 44 Only a few decades
ago employers used honesty testing to evaluate employees. 45 During the 1970s, chemical companies required workers to submit to
46
genetic screening.'

Testing for HIV detects a different quality about workers-health.
Employers need a healthy work force because poor health causes
excessive absenteeism, high insurance costs, safety problems, disability, and sometimes even death.' 4 7 In addition to health problems,
employers must deal with problems stemming from healthy employ142. See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERTS. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 136, 14142 (2d ed. 1985) (asserting that total costs of hiring may be lower for firms when hiring standards are used rather than when firms rely on more intensive investigations of applicant
characteristics).
143. See Bible, supra note 2, at 195 (discussing tests commonly used by employers in examining background and abilities of job candidates).
144. d
145. See id (stating that honesty testing originated in area of criminal science in 1920s).
Employers tested job candidates for honesty through polygraph tests, voice stress tests, truth
serum, and hidden cameras. Idt at 200. Employers used honesty tests to predict an applicant's reliability on the job and to assess applicants' truthfulness about their background and
abilities. Id at 195.
146. Id. Because physical and mental health can affect productivity, employers used genetic testing to determine character traits that might impact a prospective employee's ability
to perform a job. Idt at 195-96.
147. See Jill Barker, Fit for Work: Best Interests of Business Well Served by Fit Employees, THE
GAZETTE (MoN'REAL), Dec. 6, 1991, at C2 (reporting that absenteeism because of poor health
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ees who refuse to work with the HIV-positive employee, and from

consumers who might boycott the employer's business because of

148
the composition of its workforce.
A hypothetical example helps illustrate the many costs facing an
employer. 14 9 Assume that Ronald Restauranteur owns a restaurant
named Ronny's Place. Ronny's Place is located in a town with a
large AIDS-infected population. Fearing that he might employ an
AIDS-infected staff member, Ronald implements a program
whereby all current employees are required to submit to an HIV test
as a condition of continued employment. Applicants for work at the
restaurant are also required to submit to an HIV test. Ronald
agrees to finance the testing, irrespective of whether the applicant

ultimately works for him. Why would Ronald, as an employer, take
such a measure? What costs does he fear?
First, an employee who tests positive for HIV will probably require time away from work. "Full blown" AIDS is identified by certain "opportunistic" infections that invade the body when the
immune system is suppressed.150 The most common of the opportunistic infections is Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, a rare lung disease. 15 1 Treating the pneumonia requires hospitalization and a
substantial recuperation period. AIDS-related complex, the nonfatal condition related to, but significantly less severe than AIDS, also
has many debilitating symptoms. 15 2 They include recurrent fever,

fatigue, progressive weight loss, swollen lymph glands, night sweats,
costs each Canadian employer average of $600 per year - 25 times more costly than labor
strikes).
148. See Marlene Cimons, Corporate Executives Urge AIDS Policyfor Worhplace, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 1988, at 1 (noting how business community is developing response to issue of AIDS
in workplace by formulating guidelines to address concerns, such as refusal of co-worker to
work alongside employee with AIDS).
149. The restaurant example will be referred to throughout the continuation of this Article. It was chosen because it forces discussion of marginal issues. The Surgeon General's
Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome expressly raises the point. Surgeon General's Report, supra note 37, at 1-7. In discussing what constitutes safe behavior, the report
notes that AIDS cannot be transmitted from casual social contact, "even if a restaurant worker
has AIDS or carries the virus." Id. Arguably, however, the same arguments can be applied to
an employer in any business. The notion of AIDS in the food service industry, as of late, has
received increased attention. See, e.g., Frederick M. Muir, Council ieects AIDS Tests for Restaurant Workers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, at B2 (reporting defeat of controversial proposed
ordinance that would require AIDS testing of waitstaff, kitchen help, and cooks every six
months); HIV-Positive Worker Files Bias Suit, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 18, 1991, at A20 (describing
discrimination lawsuit brought against fast-food restaurant by shift manager who was fired
after being diagnosed with AIDS); Cerisse Anderson, $30,000 AIDS DiscriminationAward Upheld, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 16, 1990, at 1 (providing account of upholding on appeal of $30,000
award by administrative law judge to former waiter in discrimination case brought against
restaurant).
150. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (explaining how AIDS destroys immune
system therefore lessening ability of body to defend against disease).
151. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 37, at 6.
152. Id. at 7.
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and diarrhea.1 5 3 With either AIDS or ARC, the HIV-infected candidate will likely be absent from work, often for substantial periods of
time.
A restaurant, like any other profit-seeking operation, succeeds or
fails based largely on the performance of its workforce. A reliable
staff is critical. 15 4 An employee who constantly needs time away
from work disrupts the entire system. That an opportunistic infection may seize the HIV-infected worker without notice exacerbates
the problem. Planning cannot usually be made prior to an illness
because the employer has no time to prepare for the illness. Shifts
need to be changed. Tasks need to be re-assigned. Even temporary
help may be a necessity in some businesses. A bartender or waitperson who informs Ronald at the onset of a month-long absence
causes much disorder, potentially causing Ronny's Place to forfeit
substantial profits. Weekend evenings typically generate the most
revenue at restaurants. If, for example, Ronald cannot replace an
absent waitperson on a Saturday evening, every other waitperson
will be forced to handle additional tables.' 5 5 Service will be inadequate, which can be the downfall of any restaurant.
Second, a business that employs individuals with AIDS may unintentionally drive customers seeking similar products to establishments that hire only healthy persons. The situation, possible in
virtually every business context, is especially pronounced in the hospitality industry.15 6 Ronny's Place profits because of its customers.
153. Id. at 7-8.
154. See Barker, supra note 147, at C2 (indicating that increasing number of corporations
are beginning to examine long-term costs of managing ill health of their employees because
of realization that absenteeism, diminished or lost productivity, and retraining are all costs
employer must assume if worker is ill).

155. The waitperson who, at maximum capacity, services five tables simultaneously now
must service the regular number of tables plus additional tables that the sick employee would
have worked. Service declines for all of the tables, which can be the downfall of any restaurant.
This is not to suggest that employees do not get sick. Even an employer with a "clean"
workforce-that is, a workforce without any HIV-infected employees-suffers losses from the
last minute illnesses of its workforce. From an employer's perspective, those absences cannot
be avoided. There is no test to detect how many colds an employee will contract in a year.
But testing positive for HIV is different insofar as it unequivocally guarantees that at some
point the employee will get sick. Although this reasoning is not economically justified, it
nonetheless appeals to employers. See Leonard, supra note 83, at 955 (discussing belief of
employers that they have good reasons to preclude hiring persons who are at risk of developing AIDS).
156. The possibility of this setting has also received much attention. Even television
sitcoms have caught on. NBC's A Different World faced the issue when a college student at
Hillman College revealed to her class that she was HIV positive. A Aiferent World, NBC television broadcast, Apr. 11, 1991. The reactions of her peers varied from compassion and understanding to panic-stricken phobia and hysteria. Id. The HIV-infected student worked parttime in a restaurant that was frequented by other students. Id. After her startling revelation
in class, some students refused to eat at the restaurant or be served by the HIV-infected woman. Id.
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To hire an HIV-infected food server is to take a great chance. Customers who fear that the disease might be transmitted via food will
go elsewhere. Who wants a person with AIDS to come into contact
with food that ultimately will be ingested? Although this is an irrational concern, it nonetheless reflects society's unfortunate lack of
education about AIDS. To the ignorant patron, death-the eventual result of contracting HIV-infinitely outweighs any preference
that initially led that customer to Ronny's Place. The fact that AIDS
cannot be transmitted by casual contact is irrelevant; the fact that
many in society are ignorant about HIV is dispositive. 157
Further costs exist. Many employers realistically fear that coworkers and managers will refuse to work with an AIDS victim.1 5 8
In addition to personal disputes between workers, difficulties with
co-workers may also have great legal costs. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines recognize a Title VII
cause of action in cases where harassment creates a hostile or offensive working environment.1 5 9 The Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Wilson,' 60 established the framework for Title VII
lawsuits that hold an employer liable when co-workers disturb a protected person with a "harassing atmosphere" of teasing, racial epithets, or sexual slurs.' 6 1 These cases arguably apply to the AIDS
157. See Rick Maiman, As AIDS Spooks the Schoolroom, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 23,
1985, at 7 (reporting wave of anxiety in school systems nationwide is causing boycotts and
demonstrations because of "public ignorance" in falsely believing that AIDS can be transmitted by casual contact); Agency Plan AIDS Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1988, at CI 1 (noting
proposed guidelines for federal workplace state that regardless of fact that fellow employees
have no medical basis for refusing to work with people with AIDS virus, such concerns must
nonetheless be taken seriously and addressed through appropriate counseling).
158. See Cronan v. New England Tel. Co., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1268, 1273
(Mass. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that employee who was fired after contracting AIDS had
stated claim under Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Act for unauthorized disclosure
of confidential information, and indicating that this disclosure prompted co-worker refusal to
work with HIV-infected employee). The parties settled the suit and the plaintiff transferred to
another facility. Id.
159. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1991). This section provides:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
Id.
160. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
161. Meritor Say. Bank v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986); see Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co.,
805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) (reporting Title VII charge by female employee of environment
of sexual harassment by former employee), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Barbetta v.
Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 573-74 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding employer liable
for offensive, hostile work environment created by employees).
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setting and would accord relief to an AIDS-infected employee sub162
jected to co-worker harassment.
Finally, insurance issues also cause problems. AIDS-infected persons incur approximately $100,000 in medical costs during their remaining lifetimes.1 6 3 Regardless of whether the employer is selfinsured for health benefits or purchases health insurance, the employer will feel the economic consequences from the costs of treatments associated with AIDS.'6
IV.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

The relationship between law and economics has become increasingly intertwined during the past three decades. Despite this recent
upsurge, the intermingling of law and economics is not new. As far
back as 1916 Justice Brandeis wrote that the "[s]tudy of economics
...
embod[ies] the facts and present[s] the problems of today."' 16 5
He held the belief that "[a] lawyer who has not studied economics
• . . is very apt to become a public enemy."' 166 Several different
schools of thought offer insight as to the relationship between the
two disciplines.' 6 7 The modern school of law and economics-the
so called "new" law and economics-dates back to the early 1960s
when Guido Calabresi's first article on torts 168 and Ronald Coase's
162. See Lorynn A. Cone, AIDS and HIV Infection in the Work Place, 13 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILrrY L. REP. 70, 71 (1989) (proposing that under MeritorSavings Bank standard for finding Title VII violation, courts would allow recovery for AIDS patients whose co-workers subject them to direct harassment or "harassing atmosphere").
163. See Anne A. Scitovsky & Dorothy P. Rice, AIDS: The Cost in Dollars, THE INTERNIST 9,
11 (1987) (presenting three estimates of direct and indirect costs of AIDS epidemic in United
States in 1985, 1986, and 1991, based on prevalence estimates provided by Centers for Disease Control); see also Anne A. Scitovsky & Dorothy P. Rice, Estimates of the Direct and Indirect
Costs of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in the United States 1985, 1986, and 1991, 102 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 5 (1987) (reporting personal medical care costs as $630 million in 1985, $1.1
billion in 1986, and $8.5 billion in 1991; nonpersonal costs for research, screening, education,
and general support services as $319 million in 1985, $542 million in 1986, and $2.3 billion in
1991; indirect medical costs attributable to loss of productivity resulting from morbidity and
premature mortality as $3.9 billion in 1985, $7 billion in 1986, and $55.6 billion in 1991).
164. See Leonard, supra note 83, at 955 (discussing reasons employers avoid hiring persons who might be at risk of developing AIDS). In addition to direct costs of medical benefits
to an employee with AIDS, employers are concerned with associated indirect costs, including
decreased workplace morale and increased management stress in dealing with the employee.
IdL
165. Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 U. ILL. L. REv. 461, 470 (1916).
166. Id. (quoting Professor Hendeson).
167.

See generally NICHOLAS MERCURO & TIMOTHY RYAN, LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POL-

icy 13-42 (1984) (categorizing schools of thought as "new" law and economics, economics of
property rights, "old" law and economics, public choice theory, neoinstitutionalist economic
theory, and critical legal studies).
168. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE LJ.
499 (1961) (discussing how society ought to distribute its economic losses).
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article on social cost' 6 9 were published.170 Today, economics is regularly applied to an ever-increasing range of legal fields. Indeed, as
Judge Richard Posner noted, economics now applies across the
board "to common law fields such as torts, contracts, restitution,
admiralty, and property; the theory and practice of punishment;
civil, criminal, and administrative procedure; the theory of legislation and regulation; law enforcement and judicial administration;
7
and even constitutional law, primitive law, and jurisprudence."' '
A.

Becker's Model of Discrimination

The most widely accepted economic theory of discrimination was
written by Gary Becker.' 72 This section of the Article applies
7 3 to analyze
Becker's seminal work, The Economics of Discrimination,1
economic causes and ramifications of mandatory HIV testing and
resulting discrimination. Although other approaches have been advanced to examine the impact of HIV testing, none has been as uniformly accepted. Even the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's Proposed Rules for the Equal Employment for Indi74
viduals with Disabilities cites Becker.
Becker's notion of "taste for discrimination" is the foundation of
his theory and is crucial in understanding his ideas. He writes:
Money, commonly used as a measuring rod, will also serve as a
measure of discrimination. If an individual has a "taste for discrimination," he must act as ifhe were willing to pay something,
either directly or in the form of a reduced income, to be associated with some persons instead of others. When actual discrimination occurs, he must, in fact, either pay or forfeit income for this
privilege. This simple way of looking at the matter gets at the
169. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (discussing problem
of allocating costs of economic externalities in law).
170. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 19-20 (3d ed. 1986) (describing
early attempts to apply economics systematically to law).
171. Id
172. See MATS LUNDAHL & ESKIL WADENSJO, UNEQUAL TREATMENT. A STrUDY IN THE NEoCLASSICAL THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION 1-3 (1984) (describing importance and acceptance of
Becker's model). See generally LLOYD G. REYNOLDS ET AL., LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 240-49 (9th ed. 1986) (discussing and applying Beckerian model).
173. GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971); see also LUNDAHL &
WADENSJO, supra note 172, at 1-7 (describing Beckerian model). It should be noted at the
outset that no understanding of economics by the reader is presupposed. The theories herein
are explained, with one exception, without the use of graphs or mathematics.
174. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734, 35,737 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630) (effective
July 26, 1992) ("These [market] failures have been explained in three different ways in the
seminal works ofBecker, Thurow, and Arrow. These works originally addressed race discrimination, but they are equally applicable to discrimination against disabled workers."); see also
infra notes 232-44 and accompanying text (discussing federal response to AIDS question in
employment setting).
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essence of prejudice and discrimination. 175
When applied to AIDS and the workplace, Becker's model covers
employers, employees, and customers. This section will discuss the
taste for discrimination of employers, employees, and customers.
The employer's taste for discrimination, which is the most dominant
factor, will be discussed at length.
1.

The employer's tastefor discrimination

According to Becker, an employer who has a taste for discrimination will be willing to pay higher wages to ensure that certain groups
are not extended offers of employment.' 76 Firms face a finite
number of candidates to whom employment offers may be extended.' 77 This group is termed the labor market.178 The firm that
discriminates, whether because of gender, skin color, national origin, or infection with a virus, excludes a portion of its labor
79
market. 1
Briefly revisiting our hypothetical example helps illustrate. Assume that 100 people are eligible to work as waitpersons at Ronny's
Place. Conditioning employment on the results of an HIV test
would reduce the pool of eligible candidates. Fifteen percent of the
applicants, for example, might test positive. The total number of
eligible candidates would decrease to eighty-five. Ronny's Place,
simply by implementing mandatory HIV testing, must pay a higher
wage rate.
The argument is best illustrated by using simple supply and demand curves. In terms that economists use, the supply of workers
shifts inward because a portion of the labor pool is excluded from
175. Becker, supra note 173, at 14 (emphasis in original).
176. Id at 14-15. Becker's taste for discrimination is measured by the difference between
the wage rate that would be offered to a woman or minority worker relative to an equally
qualified majority worker. Thus, if an employer can hire an AIDS victim at a wage W, the
employer's discrimination measured by the coeffident di, becomes
di=(W/Wm)- 1
where Wm = the wage the employer would offer the AIDS victim or other minority. Id.; see
also DANIEL S. HAMERMESH & ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF WORK AND PAY 350 (4th ed.
1988) (explaining Becker's theory of discrimination).
177. See RoYJ. RUFFIN & PAUL R. GREGORY, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMIcs 331 (4th ed.
1990) (noting that employers face limited number of qualified candidates at each wage level
offered in marketplace). Of course, if a firm offers a higher wage, the number of qualified job
candidates will increase because more workers will be willing to work for a higher wage.
178. See id at 328 (defining labor market as "an arrangement that brings buyers and sellers of labor services together to agree on pay and working conditions").
179. See REYNOLDS, supra note 172, at 240-41 (noting that workers who are victims of
discrimination will be excluded from labor market due to firms' unwillingness to pay equal
wages to them vis-A-vis other candidates in labor market).
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consideration. The number of waitpersons needed to staff Ronny's
Place, termed the demand, remains constant.

C.)
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(b)
(a)
SUPPLY AND DEMAND CURVES TO DETERMINE WAGE RATES 180
Graph (a) represents the supply and demand for workers in a firm
that does not test for HIV. The point where the demand curve (D)
intersects the supply curve (S) is the equilibrium wage rate (P),
which is the amount Ronald must pay his staff. Graph (b) represents
the supply and demand for workers in a firm that requires HIV tests,
and subsequently discriminates against AIDS patients. Because
there are fewer candidates from which to choose, supply shifts inward and becomes S'. The demand for staff (D) remains constant.
The point where the demand curve intersects the new supply curve
is the new equilibrium wage rate (P') for the discriminating firm.
The new wage rate increases because of the shift in supply. Therefore, the firm that requires an HIV test prior to employment is
18
forced to pay a higher wage rate. '
Economic rationality suggests that the profit-seeking firm that
chooses to discriminate disadvantages itself because it is forced to
pay a higher price for the same labor.' 82 An employer's decision to
discriminate against those who test positive for HIV indicates that
the employer is maximizing utility, not profits. l8 3 The employer
180. See Kenneth Vogel, Discriminationon the Basis of HIV Infection: An Economic Analysis, 49
ST. LJ. 965, 976 (1988) (using graph to show upward shift of labor supply curve for
firms that discriminate, resulting in higher wage rate).
181. Id.
182. See HAMERMESH & REES, supra note 176, at 352 (noting that discrimination causes
higher wages due to decrease in labor market).
183. See id- (stating that discriminatory employers maximize utility through willingness to
OHIO
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who discriminates on the basis of HIV values the composition of its
workforce over monetary returns.1 84 Even though the equilibrium
wage rate might be four dollars per hour, the employer would be
willing to pay six dollars per hour to regulate the composition of its
employees.
A worker who tests positive for HIV might not develop any
debilitating symptoms of AIDS for ten years.18 5 In many instances
the infected worker is as productive as any other worker. Assuming
that the productivity of the healthy worker equals the productivity of
the infected worker, the discriminating employer pays more for the
same product. Labor is like any other commodity to the employer. 18 6 Paying more for a worker with the same productivity is
no different than paying more for the same, fungible widget. The
employer pays higher-than-necessary wages, thereby forfeiting
money profits to satiate its taste for discrimination.
In a system of competitive markets-assuming that other firms are
18 7
not discriminatory-the firm that chooses to discriminate will fail.
18
8
In a competitive market, no economic profits exist.
The firm that
pays a higher rate not to employ HIV-infected persons operates at a
loss as compared to those firms willing to hire HIV-infected individuals.18 9 In the long run, the firm that discriminated will not survive
sacrifice profits in form of higher wages for sake of indulging their tastes with regard to composition of their workforce).
184. See id. at 252-53 (noting that discriminatory employers sacrifice monetary returns to
indulge taste for discrimination in workforce).
185. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (noting that within 10 years of HIV
infection, about one half of individuals develop AIDS); see id. (stating that those who test
positive for HIV often do not manifest symptoms for many years).
186. See LLOYD G. REYNOLDS, MICROECONOMICS 99-100 (4th ed. 1982) (noting that firms
treat labor like other factors of production when trying to minimize cost and maximize
profits).
187. See ROGER MILLER, ECONoMIcs TODAY 523-24 (6th ed. 1988) (noting that success in
perfectly competitive market requires firm to provide product at market price). Economists
speak in terms of "perfect competition" as a market structure. Id-at 522. The perfectly competitive firm is a firm that constitutes such a small part of the total industry that it cannot affect
the price of the product it sells. IdL As a result, the perfectly competitive firm cannot affect
the price of a good. Id Four qualities characterize the perfectly competitive market: (i) there
must be a large number of buyers and sellers; (ii) the product that is sold by the firms in the
industry is homogeneous; (iii) there must be information about prices, qualities, and sources
of supply; and (iv) any firm can enter or exit the industry without serious impediment. Id,
188. l at 531-32. Economic profits differ from accounting profits. Businesspeople generally regard accounting profits as total revenues less expenses. By comparison, economists
view economic profits as total revenues minus total explicit and implicit costs. Economic profits take into account the opportunity cost of the capital that is invested into a business. In the
perfectly competitive setting there are no economic profits, whereas in the monopoly setting,
economic profits are expected. Id.
189. See RUFFIN & GREGORY, supra note 177, at 179 (noting that perfectly competitive firm
must accept market price of labor to compete with other firms in same market).
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the competition. 90 Consumers would go to the firm that maintained lower prices, namely, the nondiscriminating firm.1 9 1 Returning to our example, the cost of a hamburger at Ronny's Place
necessarily takes into account the higher compensation paid to its
staff. For instance, the price of the same hamburger at a competitor
might cost six dollars whereas the price at Ronny's Place would be
eight dollars.
This economic analysis has some exceptions. If every firm in an
industry were to discriminate against HIV-infected persons, no individual firm would be at an economic disadvantage. 19 2 That is,
Ronny's discriminating against HIV-infected persons would not disadvantage itself so long as every other restaurant in the industry
also discriminated. Industry-wide discrimination would result in a
higher cost of labor to all firms, ultimately translating into higher
prices for the consumer. 193 Thus, hamburgers everywhere would
rise to eight dollars. No firm would receive the signal that it is engaging in economically irrational behavior.
Ignoring for the moment the morality and rationality of AIDS discrimination, it is unlikely that all firms in an industry would discriminate in a competitive market. Because a competitive industry is
characterized by a large number of firms, some form of collusion
would be necessary for every firm to discriminate. If only some
firms discriminated, consumers would shift to those firms with lower
prices, namely, the nondiscriminating firms that pay less for their
labor. In the long run, the discriminating firms would be forced out
of the market while nondiscriminating firms would survive.
It is easier to discriminate when the employer is not a small business acting as one player in a large industry, but rather is a single
supplier comprising the entire industry.194 To the economist this is
known as a monopoly. 9 5- Generally, monopoly prices are higher
190. See REYNOLDS, supra note 172, at 241 (noting that competitive forces should tend to
eliminate discrimination by forcing discriminating firms to exit market).
191. See RUFFIN & GREGORY, supra note 177, at 180 (explaining that if firm A charges
higher price than firm B for identical product, no rational buyer will buy from firm A).
192. See Vogel, supra note 180, at 977 (noting that if all firms discriminate in given economic market, no firm would receive signal that its behavior was economically unsound). This
explains the necessity ofantidiscrimination laws. Where there is industry wide discrimination,
the market fails to provide economic disincentives. Where all firms in an industry discriminate against some groups these discriminatory firms are not at a competitive disadvantage visi-vis each other. Ia
193. See id (asserting that result of discrimination across industry would result in higher
prices for products).
194. See REYNOLDS, supra note 172, at 246-47 (analyzing discrimination in noncompetitive
markets where monopoly power exists).
195. See MILLER, supra note 187, at 112 (defining monopoly as "[a] firm that has great
control over the price of a good... [or] is the only seller of a good or service"). See generally
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than prices under perfect competition. 196 Unlike the perfect competitor, the monopolist realizes economic profits that are conducive
to the encouragement of discriminatory practices. 1 97 In the monopoly situation, an employer has the financial freedom to seek out nonpecuniary returns, including discriminating against AIDS victims. 198
In Becker's terms, a monopoly has a greater ability to pursue its
taste for discrimination. 199 The monopolist, because it receives a
higher-than-normal price for its goods, can afford to pay a higher
wage rate to its employees to ensure getting only certain groups in
the workforce. 200 The monopolist, as the only supplier in the industry, will not be at a debilitating disadvantage simply because it
charges inflated prices that reflect its discrimination. Profits will be
reduced, but the monopolist will not be forced to exit the
industry. 20 '
An example helps clarify the issue. Assume that Ronald secured a
patent for an ingredient, such as a spice, that made his hamburgers
infinitely more tasty than his competitors' hamburgers. Ronny's
Place would have a monopoly on those types of hamburgers. Because the patent prevents competition on that product, a higherthan-normal price could be charged. Ronny's Place would be reaping economic profits that would enable it to implement mandatory
HIV testing.
The extent to which a firm will be able to implement mandatory
HIV testing and subsequently discriminate against AIDS-infected
employees varies with the level of competitiveness. A firm in a
purely competitive industry lacks the profits to purchase according
to its taste for discrimination, whereas a firm in a monopolistic setting may realize profits, thus enabling it to engage in discriminatory
behavior. A firm in a market that is neither purely competitive nor
monopolistic will be able to discriminate only to the extent it realizes economic profits.
& ECONOMICS, AN INTRODUCrORY ANALYSIS 315, 316 (2d ed. 1988)
(describing economic incentive to monopolize market).
196. See RUFFIN & GREGORY, supra note 177, at 216-17 (discussing monopoly pricing).
WERNER HIRSCH, LAW

197. Id.
198. See REYNOLDS, supra note 172, at 246-47 (rationalizing that monopoly position allows
discrimination because normal market concerns do not apply).
199. See BECKER, supra note 173, at 46-47 (applying "taste for discrimination" analysis to
monopoly situation).
200. See REYNOLDS, supra note 172, at 246-47 (noting that discrimination is basically
costless to firm operating under monopolistic conditions).
201. For an empirical discussion of Becker's "taste for discrimination" model as applied
to monopolies, see BECKER, supra note 173, at 47-50.
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The employee's tastefor discrimination

Becker's theory can also be applied to employees. 20 2 Under this
approach, employees might also have a taste for discrimination. 20 3
Anxiety over the possibility of contracting HIV plagues those who
work with an AIDS-infected employee. Uneducated employees fear
working with those who are HIV-positive. A task as routine as sharing dishes in a cafeteria could frighten the ignorant staff worker,
even though the dishes have been washed and sanitized. 20 4 Because
healthy workers will perceive their close association with infected
workers as a risk, healthy workers will demand higher-than-normal
wages to work with AIDS victims. If the job entails supervising
workers who have AIDS, the manager of Ronny's Place, for example, might demand a $28,000 a year salary instead of the lower, normal rate of $23,000. Without the increased compensation, the
employee has no reason to remain in the same setting, and would
seek employment for the same wage rate at a firm that did not employ AIDS-infected workers. In order to keep healthy employees,
the employer needs to pay a higher-than-normal wage rate to compensate for the employee's perceived risks. As a result, employers
have an incentive not to hire HIV-infected persons because additional compensation would be required for all employees. 20 5 Paying
a higher wage rate to employees results in higher costs for the employer's goods. The firm that pays higher wages to its employees
passes the costs to its consumers. The same results that occurred
when the employer pays a higher wage to exercise its taste for discrimination are also seen when employees exercise their tastes for
206
discrimination.
3.

The customer's tastefor discrimination

Finally, Becker's theory can be applied to customers, who also pay
higher prices to discriminate against HIV-infected workers.2 07 As in
the case with the employer and employee, whether a consumer
202. See id at 55 (applying "taste for discrimination" model to employees of businesses).
203. This idea is not novel and has been observed in practice. An empirical study found
support for the hypothesis that white male workers act as if they have a taste for discrimination against minorities in the United States. Barry Chiswick, Racial Discrimination in the Labor
Market: A Test of Alternative Hypotheses, in 2 PATrERNS OF RACIAL DIsCRIMINATION 10 1-20
(George M. von Furstenberg et al. eds., 1974).
204. See infra note 257 and accompanying text (describing responses to AIDS victims).
205. See REYNOLDS, supra note 172, at 242 (analyzing employer-employee relationship
when employee has taste for discrimination).
206. See supra notes 176-99 and accompanying text (discussing results of employer's taste
for discrimination).
207. See BECKER, supra note 173, at 75-77 (applying taste for discrimination model to customers of business).
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harbors a taste for discrimination against AIDS victims depends on
that person's education about the disease. The customers who apprise themselves about the modes of transmission of HIV will have a
lesser taste for discrimination, whereas the consumers who succumb
to the AIDS hysteria will be willing to pay more to discriminate. Put
another way, an informed consumer will be less willing to pay more
to avoid AIDS victims than will the ignorant consumer.
The consumer's taste for discrimination is also a function of the
type of business that the employer operates. 208 In some industries a
consumer would be less likely to pay higher prices to avoid people
with AIDS. For example, it is doubtful that a person who subscribes
to a periodical such as Time would be willing to pay an additional
amount if the publisher hired only noninfected journalists. In that
setting, the consumer never comes into contact with the reporter,
and even the most ignorant among us knows that HIV cannot be
transmitted from a reporter writing for the magazine to the reader.
The consumer gains nothing from paying even a penny more than
the normal subscription rate.
A consumer's taste for discrimination displays itself more distinctly in the restaurant setting. 20 9 Food, unlike a periodical, gets
ingested by the consumer. The fear that HIV might be transmitted
by a waitperson with AIDS causes the consumer to foster an increased taste for discrimination. As contracting HIV means certain
death, the uneducated consumer's taste for discrimination results in
the consumer's willingness to pay eight dollars for a hamburger instead of six dollars, so long as healthy workers cook and serve the
hamburger.
B.

Costs to Society

Discrimination against persons infected with HIV is inefficient to
society as well as to the individual employer. Society suffers because
investment in training of employees is lost.2 10 Productivity levels
are also lost. 2 11 An employer expends resources to train an individual for a particular position.2 12 Initially, there is no return on that
capital expenditure. In the hypothetical example, Ronald teaches
208. See REYNOLDS, supra note 172, at 242 (noting that consumer discrimination is much
more relevant in sales-oriented jobs as opposed to production-oriented jobs).
209. See id (inferring that because restaurant requires close contact with consumers, level
of potential taste for discrimination is higher).
210.

See Vogel, supra note 180, at 975 (arguing that expenditures on workers' prior train-

ing will be wasted when worker is discriminated against and cannot find similar employment).
211. See id. at 974-76 (contending that employers who discharge employees on basis of
unfounded fears waste investment that has been made to increase employees' productivity).
212. Id. at 975.
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new employees the specifics of Ronny's Place, such as the items on
the menu and the computer system. First-time employees are instructed on the specifics of their positions. An applicant who never
before has tended bar, for example, needs to learn the mechanics of
that position. The resources that the employer expends on training
realize no return until the employee actually begins working.

AIDS cannot be contracted by casual contact.213 Terminating a
current employee because of a positive result on an HIV test promotes inefficiency in three ways. 214 First, terminating an HIV-infected employee wastes at least some of the resources spent on
training the individual. 215 For the inexperienced employee learning
a new trade, all the training will not be wasted if that employee subsequently secures a similar job, but with a different business entity.216 However, that portion of the training specifically relating to
Ronny's Place will be wasted. Inefficiency also occurs if the employee remains with the same business entity, but transfers to a different position. 21 7 Second, a rational employer chooses an
employee based in part on the perceived potential productivity of
that worker. 218 Terminating that employee means that the employer loses a high-caliber producer. Third, workers develop skills
with time on thejob. 219 Therefore, when an AIDS victim gets terminated or reassigned due to society's irrational fears, society loses the
benefit of the productivity that this worker gained from experience
on the job.
213. See supra notes 38-68 and accompanying text (discussing ways HIV may be
transmitted).
214. See Vogel, supra note 180, at 974-75 (discussing economic inefficiency in light of employment discrimination).
215. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing loss of money spent on worker
who is subsequently fired by discriminating firm).
216. See Vogel, supra note 180, at 975 (contending that employee training is especially
wasted when employee cannot be placed in alternative equal employment). For example, an
inexperienced bartender who learns the trade from on-the-job experience at Ronny's Place,
but subsequently is terminated after an HIV test, might secure ajob elsewhere because of the
past bartending training.
217. An example of this would occur if the bartender was transferred to a position in
which food handling was not necessary, perhaps to corporate headquarters.
218. See Vogel, supra note 180, at 974-75 (positing that employees are hired because their
productivity potential is greater than those not hired).
219. See id. at 975 (noting that employees learn on-the-job skills not learned during training). Keeping within the restaurant framework, a veteran bartender is infinitely more productive than a bartender who is first learning to pour. The experienced bartender finds common
denominators in drinks. A "Martini" and a "Tom Collins," for example, both contain gin.
The experienced bartender will prepare the glasses for the drinks simultaneously, only needing to retrieve the bottle of gin once. By contrast, the inexperienced bartender will pour the
drinks separately, which requires retrieving the bottle of gin twice. Thus, the inexperienced
bartender takes much longer to produce the same product.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

A.

The States' Response

Legislators at both the state and federal level have begun to respond to the AIDS question in the employment setting. Some inroads have been made. Many states have enacted laws that deal with
HIV-related or AIDS-related issues in the workplace. Recent state
legislation in several states forbids employers from requiring applicants or current employees to submit to HIV-antibody tests, except
2 20
in limited circumstances.
The Florida statute, representative of this type of state legislation,
specifically addresses discrimination on the basis of AIDS, ARC, and
HIV. Under the Florida provision, an employer may not "require
an individual to take a human immunodeficiency virus-related test as
a condition of hiring, promotion, or continued employment unless
the absence of human immunodeficiency virus infection is a bona
fide occupational qualification for the job in question."'2 2 1 An em220. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.22 (West 1990) (requiring written, informed consent of subject as precondition to administering test for antibodies associated with causative
agent of AIDS); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50(3)(a) (West Supp. 1992) (mandating that no person
be required to submit to human immunodeficiency virus-related test unless absence of human
immunodeficiency virus infection is bona fide qualification for job sought); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, §§ 19203-19206 (West Supp. 1991) (requiring informed written consent of subject
and limiting disclosure of results of HIV test to subject, health care providers designated by
subject, persons designated by subject, and certain government agencies and research facilities); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 70F (Supp. 1991) (prohibiting employers from requiring
HTLV-III antibody or antigen test as condition for employment); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 81.102 (West 1991) (establishing that no person may require another to undergo procedure to help determine presence of AIDS or HIV infection unless procedure relates to bona fide occupational qualifications of individual and no less discriminatory means
exists); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1990) (stating that it is unlawful employment
practice to discriminate against employee on basis of HIV-related blood test or to require
another person to submit to HIV-related blood test); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.172 (Supp.
1988) (mandating that employers not require persons to submit to HIV test or discriminate
on basis of HIV test unless absence of HIV infection is bona fide occupational qualification).
For instance, Massachusetts and Vermont prohibit employers from testing for the HIV virus
as a condition for employment. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 70F (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 495(a)(6), (7) (Supp. 1990). California and Maine limit the testing of employees andjob
applicants for the HIV virus by requiring the informed, written consent of the subject to the
disclosure of test results as a precondition to testing. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 199.22(a) (West 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203-A (West 1991). Florida, Texas,
and Washington allow applicants for employment or current employees to be tested for the
HIV virus only if the absence of HIV infection is a bona fide occupation qualification for the
job at issue. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50(3)(a) (West Supp. 1992); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 81.102 (West 1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.172 (Supp. 1988).
Texas also requires that an employer show that testing is necessary as a bona fide occupational qualification. TFX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.102(b) (West 1991). Similarly,
Washington limits the scope of permissive testing by finding a bona fide occupational qualification to exist when "performance of a particular job can be shown to present a significant
risk, as defined by the board of health by rule, of transmitting HIV infection to other persons,
and there exists no means of eliminating the risk by restructuring thejob." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 49.60.172(3) (Supp. 1988).
221. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50(3)(a) (West Supp. 1992).
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ployer who justifies HIV testing by claiming that a bona fide occupational qualification exists must satisfy two burdens of proof. First,

the HIV-related test must be necessary to determine whether employees are able to perform the duties of their particular position, or

to determine whether employees present a significant risk of transmitting HIV to other persons in the course of normal work activities. 222 Second, no means of reasonable accommodation short of
requiring that the individual be free of HIV must exist.2 23 The provision has not yet been interpreted by any judicial forum. 224
B.

The Federal Response

OnJuly 26, 1990, President Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) into law. 22 5 The ADA, which was introduced by the 101st Congress in May 1989, prohibits workplace
discrimination based on a wide range of disabilities, including
AIDS. 2 26 The ADA sets the parameters within which HIV-infected
persons may enforce their rights against discrimination in the areas
of employment, 2 27 public accommodations, 2 28 transportation, 2 29
public services, 23 0 and telecommunications. 2 3 1
222. Id. § 760.50(3)(c)(1).
223. Id. § 760.50(3)(c)(2).
224. The Florida Court of Appeals expressly cited the provision in Hummer v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 573 So. 2d 135, 138 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The court held
that an HIV-positive employee was entitled to unemployment benefits and did not engage in
misconduct by falsely representing to his employer that he was selling products on the side,

when, in fact, he had taken one leave day a month for HIV treatment. Id. at 138. The court
based its holding on past cases involving alleged employee misconduct and ruled that Hummer's misrepresentations did not amount to misconduct. Id. Referring to section 760.50, the
court stated that the "[l]egislature has expressly recognized that AIDS victims suffer from
irrational discrimination." Id. Further, the court observed that the "statute prohibits any
AIDS-related discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations, or governmental services." Id at 138 n.1.
225. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112).
226. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), § 102(a), Pub. L. No. 101-336,
104 Stat. 327, 331-32 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112). Section 102(a) states that "[n]o
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement,
or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id The ADA broadly defines "disability" as "(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such
an impairment." Id. § 3(2), 104 Stat. at 329-30 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102). Of
particular significance to AIDS victims, the ADA specifically extends the prohibition against
discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of medical examinations and inquiries.
Id. § 102(c), 104 Stat. at 332-33 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112).
227. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 101-108, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327, 330-37 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117).
228. Id. §§ 301-310, 104 Stat. at 353-65 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189).
229. Id. §§ 221-231, 104 Stat. at 338-46 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12150,
12161-12165).
230. Id. § 201-205, 104 Stat. at 337-38 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134).
231. Id. §§ 401-402, 104 Star. at 366-69 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611).
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The ADA specifically addresses the question of whether an employer may screen applicants and current workers for HIV. Under
the ADA, an employer may not require an applicant for a job to
submit to a medical examination either prior to a job offer 23 2 or as
part of a conditional job offer. 23 3 The employer may, however,
question applicants as to their ability to perform job-related functions such as driving a car, lifting fifty pounds, or answering the tele23 4
phone, so long as these are essential functions of the job.
Under the ADA, an employer is allowed to extend a conditional
job offer to an applicant. Once the employer determines that an
applicant possesses the necessary qualifications for a position, the
employer may condition the employment on the applicant's results
of a medical test. 23 5 The ADA limits the use of these examinations
in three ways. First, the employer must require all applicants to take
a medical test; the employer may not require a select group of applicants to submit to the test. 23 6 The requirement of an HIV test, for
example, must be a routine one requested of all applicants for a particularjob category. 23 7 Second, the results of any medical examination must be kept strictly confidential. 23 8 Third, the results of the
medical examination may not be used to withdraw the conditional
job offer from an applicant unless the results indicate that the applicant is no longer qualified to perform thejob. 2 39 This section of the
ADA is probably the most important provision pertaining to HIV
240
testing.
The two-step process requiring a conditional job offer prior to
testing protects "applicants with disabilities by allowing them to isolate, if and when, their disability unjustifiably influenced a hiring
232.
233.

Id § 102(c)(2)(A).
Id § 102(c)(3)(A)-(C).

234. IA § 102(c)(2)(B).
235. Id § 102(c)(3) ("A covered entity may require ... a medical examination after an
offer of employment has been made to a job applicant and prior to the commencement of the
employment duties of such applicant, and may condition an offer of employment on the resuits of such examination.").
236. Id.§ 102(c)(3)(A).
237. Id
238. IA § 102(c)(3)(B) (mandating that information obtained be stored in separate files
and treated as confidential). Information, however, may be given to supervisors concerning
necessary restrictions of duties, first aid and safety personnel, and government officials investigating compliance with the ADA. Id.
239. L § 102(c)(3)(C). Withdrawing a conditional offer based solely on the test results
and not on the applicant's inability to perform the job constitutes discrimination thereby violating the mandate of § 102(c)(3)(C) that "the results of such examination ...[be] ...used
only in accordance with this subchapter." Id
240. Chai R. Feldblum, Medical Examinations and Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: A View From the Inside, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 521, 532-33 (1991) (stating that requirement
prohibiting withdrawal of conditional job offer unless applicant is no longer qualified to perform job is of key importance to Act).
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practice." 24 1 If an applicant who was judged sufficiently qualified to
receive a conditional job offer can assume that the only medical information of interest revealed was that the person was HIV-positive,
the applicant could probably isolate HIV status as the determining
2 42
factor in the employment decision.
The employment-related provisions of the ADA become effective
on July 26, 1992 for employers with twenty-five or more workers,
and on July 26, 1994 for employers with fifteen to twenty-four workers.2 48 The ADA does not cover employers with fewer than fifteen
workers, as they are not covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.244
C.

The Bigger Picture

Resting alone, in a vacuum, applying the Beckerian model to help
analyze the economic issues surrounding mandatory HIV testing
and discrimination against AIDS victims is of limited usefulness.
The model merely helps predict the behavior of employers, employees, and consumers. To that end, it is an effective lens through
which to view the AIDS question. But one should not examine the
bark of a tree without examining the tree itself. What doors of
thought are opened by studying the economics of HIV in the workplace? Should not the appraisal also consider those disciplines that
are higher on the jurisprudential food chain? In short, how does the
economic assessment shed light on the bigger picture?
1.

Utility

Examining the economic issues that surround AIDS provides an
effective springboard into an investigation of whether discrimina241. Id at 533.
242. Id (observing that two-step process allows applicants with disabilities to isolate when
their disability influenced hiring process).
243. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(b) (1988). Section 106 of the ADA requires that the EEOC promulgate substantive regulations to implement subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, which deals
with government employees. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1988). On February 28, 1991, the EEOC
issued proposed rules. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 56 Fed. Reg. 8578 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 1630)
(proposed Feb. 28, 1991). As evidenced by the interpretive guidance, some of the provisions
are intended to address the issue of HIV-testing. Section 1630.13(b) of the Proposed Rules
provides the following guidance:
The purpose of this provision is to prevent the administration to employees of
medical tests or inquiries that do not serve a legitimate business purpose. For example, if an employee suddenly starts to use increased amounts of sick leave or starts to
appear sickly, an employer could not require that employee to be tested for AIDS,
HIV infection, or cancer unless the employer can demonstrate that such testing isjob
related and consistent with business necessity.
56 Fed. Reg. 8601.
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tion against HIV-infected persons violates, or is in accordance with,
traditional notions of utility. 2 45 A society's failure to create a law
prohibiting mandatory HIV testing and discrimination based on
HIV, or its creation of a law requiring HIV testing, constitutes antiutilitarian behavior. 24 6 In simplest terms, utility means achieving
245. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principlesof Morals and Legislation, in THE GREAT
LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 262, 263 (Clarence Morris ed., 1959). Bentham wrote:

By utility is meant... [that which] ... tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure,
good, or happiness ...

or... to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or

unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community....
Of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility one may always say either
that it is one that ought to be done, or at least that it is not one that ought be done.
246. In several settings, legislation is being introduced that would mandate HIV testing.
For example, a dentist in Florida who allegedly infected his patients with AIDS "sparked an
avalanche of bills in the state Legislature where some lawmakers seek to expand vastly the
power of the state to test people against their will for the disease and to keep track of the
results." Ellen McGarrahan, Bills Urge Mandatory AIDS Tests, MMmi HERALD, Apr. 2, 1991, at

6A; see supra note 57 (discussing example of Florida dentist in context of various modes of
transmission of disease). These bills would require that mandatory HIV tests be required of
"doctors, patients, people charged with sex crimes or indecent behavior, people seeking treatment at hospitals receiving public money and drug users ....
McGarrahan, supra, at 6A.
Despite the fact that HIV testing provisions may be anti-utilitarian, this fact has not dissuaded state legislatures from acting. Numerous state legislatures have introduced a multitude of legislation concerning the mandatory AIDS testing of health care workers and health
care professionals. See generally Ariz. H.B. 2024, 40th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1992) (requiring Director of State Department of Health Services to issue rules concerning health care providers
that could require periodic AIDS testing and restrict practice of those who test positive); Del.
H.B. 191, 136th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1992) (proposing AIDS and HIV testing of health
care professionals by State Board of Health every six months, limiting practice of those who
test positive, and mandating disclosure of test results to patients); Md. S.B. 18, 398th Legis.
Sess., Reg. Sess. (1992) (requiring HIV testing for health care providers); Md. H.B. 644,
398th Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (1992) (requiring periodic HIV testing of health care workers,
establishing review of results by expert panel, and protecting confidentiality); Mass. S.B. 423,
177th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (1991) (proposing mandatory blood testing of health care providers); Mass. H.B. 4345, 177th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (1991) (providing for AIDS testing of
health care workers); Mich. H.B. 5062, 86th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1992) (requiring periodic
AIDS testing of health care professionals); N.J. S.B. 3588, 204th Legis., 2d Reg. Sess. (1991)
(requiring HIV testing for health care professionals working in hospitals); 1991 N.Y. S.B.
4732, 214th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1992) (creating duty of physicians, dentists, and
patients to disclose positive HIV test result prior to performance ofinvasive procedure); 1991
S.C. H.B. 4151, Statewide Sess. (1992) (requiring health care providers to be tested for HIV
at time of application for licensure, registration, or reapplication); 1991 Tenn. S.B. 810, 97th
Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1992) (mandating HIV testing for health care workers); 1991
Tenn. H.B. 945, 97th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1992) (proposing HIV testing for health
care providers).
It is too soon to tell how this legislation will fare. An Ohio bill concerning the HIV testing
of health care providers passed the State House and is being considered by the State Senate.
1991 Ohio H.B. 419, 119th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. The bill would require a dentist, dental hygienist, nurse, podiatrist, or physician who has received a positive HIV test result to
inform the Department of Health, the licensing board, the health care facility employer, and
certain patients. Id. In comparison, a New Hampshire bill requiring health care providers
who perform certain procedures to be tested for communicable diseases failed to pass the
State Senate. 1991 N.H.S.B. 312, 152d Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess.
In many instances, the proposed legislation depicts the ignorance and irrationality that pervade public reaction to the AIDS epidemic. An Arizona bill would repeal the law requiring
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the most good for the most people in a society. Irrational hysteria
over the remote, almost nonexistent possibility of contracting AIDS
by casual contact causes society as a whole to lose, and simultaneously inflicts additional pain upon the afflicted.
Society loses because the price of goods increases when busi247
nesses are allowed to discriminate against HIV-infected persons.
The market would control price increases but for the possibility that
every firm in an industry would choose to discriminate. 248 Ideally,
the nondiscriminating firm would be the norm. A firm that discriminated would need to charge higher prices, forcing it to leave the
industry. 249 The market fails to regulate prices, however, when
every firm discriminates, resulting in the price of all goods increasing.250 Consequently, consumers are left with less disposable income than they would have under a system that does not permit
mandatory HIV testing. Because a larger portion of the consumer's
fixed income is being spent to consume the same amount of goods,
25
less is available for consumption of other goods. '
the consent of a subject for an HIV test. Ariz. S.B. 1518, 40th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1992). A

Hawaii bill would authorize a physician, without the consent of the patient, to order an HIV
test before rendering treatment. 1991 Haw. S.B. 689, 16th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1992). The
results of the HIV test would become part of the patient's medical records. Id

Further complicating matters is a recently released study by the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC). Update: Investigationsof Persons Who Have Been Treated by HIV-Infected Health-Care Workers, 41 MoRBIDrry & MORTALITY WKLY.REP. 344 (1992). The CDC evaluated the HIV status of
15,795 people treated by 32 HIV-infected health-care workers. Id at 345. The CDC identified 84 patients of the HIV-infected health-care workers, specifically of dentists and surgeons,
as HIV positive. Id After investigating 47 of those cases, the CDC uncovered no evidence
that any of the patients contracted the virus from health-care workers. Id. at 346. The CDC
investigation concluded that "the risk for HIV transmission from an infected [health-care
worker] to a patient during an evasive procedure is very small. The investigation of a dental
practice in Florida remains the only instance in which transmission of HIV from an infected
[health-care worker] to patients has been reported." Id.
247. See supra notes 176-219 and accompanying text (discussing costs of discrimination in
workplace).
248. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text (discussing effects of industry-wide
discrimination).
249. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text (stating that in perfectly competitive
market, discriminatory businesses would be forced to incur higher costs, and thus, be driven
out of business).
250. See supra notes 192-93 (explaining that exception to market regulation of employment occurs where every firm in industry discriminates, thereby ensuring that no individual
firm is at economic disadvantage).
251. Utility analysis also plays a role in economic theory, although it differs from Bentham's utilitarian theory. In economic terms, utility means "[t]he want-satisfying power of a
good." JAMES HARVEY DODD & CARL W. HASEK, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS
66 (1948) (emphasis in original). Assume that a piece of pie represents the income that a
consumer earns in a year. The pie has eight slices, each capable of being traded for goods.
Under a system that prohibits HIV discrimination in the workplace, a consumer could eat out
in a restaurant for a quarter of a piece of pie. The remainder of the pie can be used to
purchase other goods. Under a system that allows HIV discrimination in the workplace, the
same consumer will spend a half of a piece of pie for the same good, leaving less of the pie for
other goods. Because HIV cannot be transmitted through casual contact, the consumer
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Similarly, society loses because those who are HIV-positive are
forced to leave the workforce. 2 52 The social costs are great because
less supply of labor translates into higher prices, again resulting in
losses to consumers.2 5 3 Discrimination diminishes utility because
2 54
wealth-both to the consumer and to society-is lessened.
Some will argue that the possible risks of contracting HIV outweigh any costs to society, and that utility lies in expounding laws
requiring testing in the workplace, among other places. This reasoning comes from lack of education and is without medical support. 255 AIDS cannot be transmitted by casual contact; injecting
would not rationally choose to spend more pie for the same good. In other words, the consumer would not have a taste for discrimination because to do so would be irrational.
252. See supra notes 210-19 and accompanying text (describing losses to society caused by
discrimination against AIDS victims in workplace).
253. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text (describing how HIV discrimination
affects market price of labor).
254. Bentham expressly sets forth those pleasures that should be taken into account when
evaluating an activity from a utilitarian perspective. According to Bentham, the several simple
pleasures of human nature include sense, wealth, amity, good name, power, piety, benevolence, malevolence, memory, imagination, expectation, and relief. Bentham, supra note 245,
at 279-80 (emphasis added).
255. Education about AIDS needs to begin at an early age. See supra note 157 and infra
note 257 and accompanying text (illustrating irrational hysteria with which people often react
toward persons with AIDS). In addition to eliminating these fears, early education is necessary to prevent individuals from contracting the virus. The Federal Centers for Disease Control predicts that over 300,000 cases of AIDS will be reported in the next two years, up from
just over 200,000 at the present. AIDS Epidemic Passes Milestone: 200,000 Cases, Over 100,000
Dead, ATLANTA TRIB., Jan. 16, 1992, at 4A.

In Florida, the Dade County School System is implementing a curriculum that would begin
teaching children about AIDS in kindergarten. Charisse L. Grant, School Curriculum Calls for
FrankLessons on AIDS, MIMI HERAM, Apr. 27, 1991, at 5B. Kindergarten teachers will begin
with the basic facts about AIDS, including identifying it as the acronym for acquired immune
deficiency syndrome. Id. Children in the fourth grade will discuss how AIDS is transmitted.
Id By the fifth grade, students would learn about the use of condoms as a measure to prevent
transmission. Id. Students in the middle and high school grades will be exposed in detail to
the medical and sociological impact of the disease. Ia In addition to the Dade County effort,
other pubic schools are emphasizing early education of children of the hazards of HIV infection. See Maia Davis, Ventura County News Roundup: Moorpark 7th-Graders Urge AIDS Education,

L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1992, at B2 (stating that means of spreading AIDS and methods of
preventing its spread are currently part of seventh-grade curriculum); Leslie Knowlton
Herzog, Elementary Schools to OfferAIDS Class, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 27, 1992, at B5 (indicating that

Newport-Mesa Unified School District, California, is beginning second year of teaching fifthand sixth-grade students on AIDS and AIDS prevention); Ray Smith, T.H.E. Group to Be In;
Teen Mentors-In-TrainingLearn That Safe Sex Is Cool, NEWSDAY, Jan. 21, 1992, Closeup, at 25

(describing group of teenagers who train other students about HIV virus and to humanize
AIDS affliction by introducing students to persons with AIDS that are their own age); Marie C.
Franklin, An Elementary Understandingof AIDS; Teachingthe Youngest Students About the Deadly Disease; Teaching Tools, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 15, 1991, at A30 (detailing efforts of fourth-grade

teacher to instruct students about AIDS and HIV, including methods of transmission, protection against disease, and not to fear people afflicted with AIDS); Elizabeth New Weld, Today's
ClassesDiscuss HIV, T-cells and Hope, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 24, 1991, North Weekly, at I (providing overview of curriculum for ninth graders); Don Aucoin, Massachusetts Soon to Issue K-12
Curriculum Guide on AIDS; Recommendations Are Geared to Age, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13, 1991,

Metro/Region, at 1 (reporting Massachusetts' adoption of state-wide plan to teach public
school students about AIDS beginning in kindergarten, with focus on comprehending disease
and its methods of transmission, as well as undercutting youths' ignorance and negative atti-
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bodily fluids is a requisite to transmission.2 5 6 Any statement to the

contrary is simply unfounded. The most good for the most, in
short, means resisting the temptation of allowing blanket HIV test-

ing in the workplace. The implicit and explicit costs to society that
would result from implementing HIV testing and not prohibiting

the subsequent discrimination greatly outweighs the remote possibility of contracting AIDS. The greatest good for the greatest
number means, from a utilitarian perspective, that our legislative
and judicial practitioners should not expound laws that sanction discrimination by implementing HIV testing.
2. Customs as a source of law
The customs that develop in response to the AIDS epidemic will
help define the laws that will evolve. Society must fear the possibility that utility will be superseded by customary acts, which in turn
will provide the impetus to the creation of laws. Society's response
to HIV is still in the formative stages. Some who come into contact
with AIDS victims show compassion, understanding, and rationality,

while others respond with panic and hysteria.2 57 If responses tend
toward the irrational, unfortunate customs such as mandatory HIV

testing in unnecessary arenas will develop.
As these customs develop, so too will the law. Social customs protudes about people with AIDS). But see Lily Dizon & Kristina Lindgren, AIDS Education Night
Draws Only 25 People; Two Mothers Who Lost Their Sons to the Disease Are Spearheadingan Effort To
Inform Newport-Mesa Students and Parents, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1992, Metro, at B4 (indicating
that efforts to provide AIDS education for local parents and students was met with little enthusiasm and asserting that parents' lack of involvement sends message to children that they
are unconcerned and issue is not important).
256. See supra notes 38-68 and accompanying text (discussing methods by which transmission of AIDS virus is possible).
257. Hysteria seems to be more the norm than the exception. A journalist captured the
emotion well:
No sooner had the rumor about the woman begun last December than the phone
calls to her house started.
"Leave town now," the voices would say. Or more ominously, just long, heavy
breathing and the incessant "click" of the phone.
Then came the stares on the street, the whispers, the little things-like when the
grocery cashier refused to place change in her hand. Or when the drugstore clerk
disinfected the counter after she had made a purchase.
By then many in this rural community [Columbia, Louisiana] of 680 people had
heard: Although she showed no physical symptoms, the woman had tested positive
for the human immunodeficiency virus.
Marilyn Milloy, Victim of AIDS Lives Rural Nightmare, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 21, 1991, at 12A.
Education and public awareness of the HIV virus and AIDS, however, may be increasing.
Former professional basketball star, Earvin "Magic" Johnson, in particular, has raised the
public-consciousness of the HIV virus. Of Johnson's 25-point, 9-assist, 5-rebound, and 2steal performance in the 1992 NBA All-Star Game, it was observed that "more than anything
... Johnson special-delivered his intended message--that a person inflicted with the AIDS
virus can be exceedingly productive." Jack McCallum, Most Valuable Person, SPORTS ILLUSRATED, Feb. 17, 1992, at 19-20.
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vide the energy for law; they are its source. As Jean Dabin commented: "Nor is there anything to prevent a custom that originally
is a moral one or one of manners from attaining the rank of a legal
custom.... ,"258 Where education about AIDS fails, and customs
and habits develop such that mandatory HIV testing becomes the
norm, laws implementing utilitarian objectives will follow.
If the immediate attempts to educate society about AIDS fail, time

259
If
should eventually eradicate the irrational responses to HIV.

laws arise from the irrational customs that develop, then time will
erase those laws. Reason cannot be denied and will ultimately prevail. 260 Indeed, "[m]any of the legal and moral rules which obtain in
the most civilized communities, rest upon brute custom, and not
upon manly reason. They... are deeply tinctured with barbarity...
[and] will gradually disappear." 2 6 1 That AIDS cannot be transmitted by casual contact, which is "truth," will eventually come to be
knowledge and override any contrary beliefs.2 6 2 The myths that sur258. Jean Dabin, General Theory of Law, in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 466,468 (Clarence Morris ed., 1959) ("This phenomenon will be brought about precisely when in the public... there germinates the idea that the effective practice of these morals or these manners
touches in some manner upon the life of the group or its social ideal .... Moral or social
conformity thus comes to generate the judicial rule."); Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation andJurisprudence,in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 290, 291
(Clarence Morris ed., 1959) ("The sum... of this theory is that all law is originally formed in
the manner, in which, in ordinary but not quite correct language, customary law is said to
have been formed: i.e. that it is first developed by custom and popular faith, next byjurisprudence,-everywhere, therefore, by internal silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary will
of a law-giver."). See Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of te JudicialProcess, in THE GREAT LEGAL
PHILOSOPHERS 513, 519 (Clarence Morris ed., 1959) ("Life casts the moulds of conduct, which
will someday become fixed law. Law preserves the moulds, which have taken form and shape
from life."); Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theological, in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 57, 79
(Clarence Morris ed., 1959) (stating that prevailing custom obtains force of law by toleration

of custom by lawmakers).
259. Even William Shakespeare understood that time, eventually, eradicates irrational
laws and customs. He wrote:
Time, as Chorus:
[S]ince it is in my power,
To o'erthrow law and in one self-born hour

To plant and o'erwhelm custom.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE WINTER'S TALE,act 4, sc.

I.

260. John Austin, The Province ofJurisprudence Determined, Lecture III, in THE GREAT LEGAL
PHILOSOPHERS 336, 337 (Clarence Morris ed., 1959).

261.

Id

262.

Knowledge differs from belief in that knowledge is truth, whereas belief is

speculation:
SOCRATES: Now take this point. You would agree that there is such a thing as
"knowing"?
GORGIAS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And such a thing as "believing"?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well, do you think that knowing and believing are the same, or is there
a difference between knowledge and belief?
GORGIAS: I should say that there is a difference.
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round AIDS and seize the unsophisticated mind will ultimately fail
for want of reason. Reason opens the door so that truth may enter.

That reason cannot be denied should not be a surprise because
nature is inherently rational, as it is controlled by reason. 26 3 Accepting the medical truism that AIDS cannot be transmitted by casual contact, and the economic truism that AIDS-based
discrimination is irrational, the only conclusion is that mandatory

HIV testing in the workplace and AIDS-based discrimination contravene reason. Eventually society will rid itself of that which runs contrary to reason; mandatory blanket HIV testing will be prohibited.
3. Final remarks

If boundaries of time and place could be transcended, more light
could be shed on the resolution of the AIDS question. A conference

could be held in which the renowned thinkers from antiquity-Aristotle, Plato, Aquinas, Locke, Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Bentham, Hegel, Mill, Dewey, Cardozo, and Pound-would lead the way
for today's academicians and practitioners to answer the AIDS question. Bentham and Becker, and Plato and Posner, could brainstorm
and jointly pave the way for society. Together they would reason
rationally and without the effects of the media's socialization, relying on each other's mental strength to attain objectivity. They
would find a way to inject reason into the minds of the masses, such
that the simple truism-that AIDS cannot be transmitted by casual

contact-would be understood, and employers would reconsider
what seems to be the emerging trend of forcing their employees to
submit to mandatory HIV testing.

SOCRATES: Quite right; and you can prove it like this. If you were asked whether
there are such things as true and false beliefs, you would say that there are, no doubt.
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: But are there such things as true and false knowledge?
GORGIAS: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: Then knowledge and belief are clearly not the same thing.
PLATO, GORGIAS 31 (Penguin Classics ed., 1960). Knowledge is that AIDS cannot be transmitted through casual contact. Society's ignorant belief is that it can.
0ILOSO263. See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophy ofRight, in THE GREAT LEGAL P
PHERS 303 (Clarence Morris ed., 1959) ("So far as nature is concerned, people grant that ...
what knowledge has to investigate and grasp in concepts is this actual reason present in
it..
"). This conclusion is also supported by John Locke and his notions of the state of
nature. Locke asserted that "[t]he state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which
obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teachesall mankind.. " John Locke, Two Treatises
of Civil Government, Book II, Of the State of Nature, in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 137 (Clarence Morris ed., 1959) (emphasis added).

